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Abstract 
 
Background:  Improvements in medical diagnosis and treatment depend on the 
development of new medical technologies. In recent years, pharmaceutical and medical 
device industries have been criticized for limited innovative output in many different 
fields.  As a result, there have been a host of new proposals intended to stimulate 
medical innovation. Unfortunately, there is limited knowledge on how ideas for 
transformative medical products are generated and much controversy over the best 
ways to commercialize these technologies.  Few empirical studies have been conducted 
on the catalysts of or obstacles to this process.  A better understanding of the medical 
innovation process would enable policymakers to implement strategies most likely to 
successfully spur new breakthrough therapies.   
 
Methods: This thesis focused on twelve recent transformative medical innovations 
spanning a wide range of clinical disciplines.  Through qualitative analysis of semi-
structured interviews with key individuals (n=143) directly responsible for these 
innovations, insights and opinions were collected on how the lessons learned from their 
experiences inform the innovation process today.  To explore the innovation process in 
greater detail, coronary artery stents—a medical device that revolutionized 
interventional cardiology—was selected for further evaluation.  Further in-depth 
interviews with key stent innovators (n=16) assessed the roles of individuals, institutions 
and external factors in early stent innovation.  To supplement this work, a 
comprehensive quantitative assessment of the patent literature spanning 10 years prior 
to FDA approval of the first coronary stent was done to study changes over time in the 
sources of innovation in this field.   
 
Results:  Interviewees emphasized the central role played by forward-thinking 
individuals and their supporting institutions in driving medical innovation.  In addition, 
respondents discussed the importance of collaboration between individuals and 
institutions to share resources and expertise.  A strong foundation in well-delineated 
basic science was also cited as a major contributing factor to the eventual success of an 
innovation.  Interviewees agreed on a few obstacles to transformative innovation, 
including a greater emphasis on patenting in academia, difficulty negotiating the 
technology transfer process, barriers to open collaboration between industry and 
academia, and funding constraints.  Increased regulatory demands, reimbursement 
concerns and luck were not commonly described as factors that influenced 
transformative innovation.  The in-depth study of stents corroborated these themes, 
particularly demonstrating the central importance of physician-inventors who saw the 
need for coronary artery stents in their clinical practice.  These physician-inventors—
including Julio Palmaz and Richard Schatz, Cesare Gianturco and Gary Roubin, and 
Ulrich Sigwart—drove early prototype designs and provided clinical validation.  Large 
companies entered afterwards with engineering support and expertise navigating the 
regulatory process.  In the patent search, 245 patents related to bare metal coronary 
artery stents were granted from 1984 (when the first patent issued in this field) to 1994 
(after the first stents were approved).  Each year showed an increase in the number of 
patent filings, from 1 in 1984 to 97 in 1994.  The largest fraction of patents was issued 
to private companies (44.9% of the total).  Public companies, individual inventors, and 
non-profit institutions represented 31.4%, 18.0%, and 5.7%, respectively.  Moreover, 
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private companies represented the majority of coronary artery patents filed in the 
earliest 5 years of the field.  The top-10 most cited patents in the field also prominently 
featured two private entities: Expandable Grafts Partnership and Cook Inc.  Both stent 
products developed from these organizations were created by or dependent on the work 
of independent academic physician-inventors.     
 
Conclusions:  Despite the relative heterogeneity of the medical innovations studied, 
transformative innovation most often originated from the insights and experiences of 
individuals with direct clinical expertise.  External factors either catalyzed (e.g., 
supportive institutions, strong underlying science and collaboration) or hindered (e.g., 
technology transfer challenges, lack of funding and onerous conflict of interest rules) the 
development process.  Strategies aimed towards promoting transformative medical 
innovation should focus on institutional-level policies targeting the earliest stages of 
innovation.  This includes providing individuals with unique expertise with the capacity to 
pursue innovative work.  Technology transfer processes should be simplified to enable 
meaningful collaboration for individuals between institutions with disparate expertise 
and resources.  Policymakers should continue to support basic science research, which 
underlies future innovations.  By contrast, policies that increase reimbursement or tax 
breaks for large institutions or extend patent terms are less likely to impact 
transformative medical innovation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The Chairman of Stryker Inc.—a Fortune 500 medical technology—explains,1 
“medical device innovation comes from the labs, the engineers, the companies. It also 
comes from the ORs and surgeons’ experience, academic labs, and universities around 
the world.”  This strikingly broad statement encapsulates the current controversy over 
the sources of medical product innovation.  While innovations certainly could come from 
all corners, where is it most likely to arise?  Who can be counted on for the most critical 
steps?  How can society support medical innovators’ progress from a design on a paper 
napkin to an assembly line?  An in-depth study of recent examples of successful 
breakthrough medical innovations may reveal valuable insights into this historically 
opaque process.   
 
1.1  Background 
Medical innovation has always been central to delivery of high quality health 
care.  However, there is ongoing concern regarding the current state of medical 
innovation.2,3  The cost of drug development continues to rise while output from the 
pharmaceutical industry has been criticized for not being “transformative,” that is, 
offering substantial improvements in patient outcomes over existing therapeutics.4  
Despite the $150 billion dollars spent on biomedical research in 2010,5 phase 2 trial 
success is at a 5 year low of 22%.6  Venture capital, a traditional source of funding for 
new breakthrough biomedical innovations, has decreased investment by 50% in the 
biotechnology and medical device sectors in the past 6 years.7  Industry has continued 
to de-vest from the total funding of early biomedical innovation from 55% in 1998 to 
25% in 2010.8  Stakeholders question whether the new drugs approved each year by 
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the FDA—many criticized as marginal improvements over existing therapies—justify the 
enormous investment.   
Some have pointed out that the pace of transformative medical product 
development in the modern era has been particularly slow when compared with the so-
called golden years of pharmaceutical and medical device innovation in the 1980s and 
1990s.9,10 On the heels of paradigm-changing advances in biotechnology tools such as 
gene cloning and expression, polymerase chain reaction, and next-generation 
sequencing, these decades saw an unprecedented rise in new classes of medications 
offering major improvements in treating cancer,11 heart disease,12 and infectious 
diseases,13 life-sustaining medical devices including implantable defibrillators14 and 
coronary artery stents,15 and important new diagnostic tests such as magnetic 
resonance imaging15 and bone densitometry.16 
In response to the lag in innovation in recent years, policymakers, patients, 
physicians, and researchers in the private and public sectors have proposed new 
policies to re-energize medical therapeutic development.17,18 For example, medical 
device industry representatives have argued that reducing the corporate tax burden will 
attract greater investment in research and development.19  Both the medical device and 
pharmaceutical companies contend that the high profit margins they enjoy20 are 
necessary for re-investment in developing new technologies.  Another suite of proposals 
from representatives from the pharmaceutical industry and patient advocates rely on 
reducing hurdles to regulatory approval of new products.21  For example, the 2012 FDA 
Safety and Innovation Act included multiple proposals designed to expedite the 
approval process for new therapies.22  But in the European Union, where regulatory 
oversight of new medical devices is much less rigorous than in the US, there is no 
 9 
evidence of better patient outcomes related to expedited treatment with more highly 
innovative devices overall.23  The scant regulatory oversight of the device market in the 
EU also permits many ineffectual or dangerous new devices from being widely used.  In 
2012, the NIH created a new center devoted to funding translational research in drug 
development to make possible therapeutic targets more attractive for subsequent 
development.4  However, without a clear understanding of the sources of medical 
innovation, there is little hope for effective policymaking that will spur new innovation.  
 
1.2 Review of approaches to studying medical innovation 
The process of developing breakthrough medical technologies remains poorly 
understood.24  Although there is evidence that innovation in medical technologies 
happen at the public/private interface,25 recent studies have illustrated the 
disproportionate benefit and impact of the public sector in the development of novel 
pharmaceuticals.26 Furthermore, there is little consensus on the contribution and roles 
of individual users in the inception and development of these radical technologies.27  A 
number of different approaches have been employed to study the innovation process. 
A qualitative research approach enables the investigation of motivations, 
reflections, and outcomes in a small cohort of subjects who share a common 
experience.28 This technique has been used previously to address fundamental 
questions relating to the development and adoption of new medical technologies.29  
Applying qualitative research methods to case study research is appropriate for 
exploring new technologies, particularly in concerns to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the 
process.30 Studies that include multiple cases are considered more robust and 
intrinsically valid given the ability to make comparisons and identify common themes.31 
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Another strategy to assess the medical device innovation process is through an 
analysis of the record of patents related to the development of a given product.  
Because patents are also published, their review can provide evidence of the timing and 
nature of a participant’s contribution to the field.  When submitting a patent application 
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), inventors are required by 
law to cite previous patents relevant to their work.32,33 As a result, patents can provide a 
useful research tool for identifying and connecting various contributors to the innovative 
process.34 For example, Trajtenberg collected patent and citation records related to 
computed tomography (CT) scanner technology, and his analysis of the results found 
that subsequent citations accurately reflect patent importance.35 Examining the patent 
literature is a viable way of assessing the origins of technology; information appears 
earlier in patents than in scientific journals and patents may include information that 
does not appear in the medical literature.36-38 
Other methods have employed bibliometric strategies to investigate the 
innovation process.  Agarwal and Searls extracted data from abstracts published in 
PubMed, literature citations and patent filings to identify drivers of innovation.  They 
postulated that this method is capable of identifying areas of increasing scientific activity 
and new therapeutic opportunities.39  The FDA also offers online, searchable databases 
of regulatory information, such as the date of approval and special designations of all 
approved drugs and devices.  Prior studies have used information from the FDA to track 
recent pharmaceutical approvals and assess which method of drug discovery led to the 
highest proportion of approved drugs.40  Although these above mentioned methods 
provide an analytically robust method to study macro-innovation, it is unable to capture 
the human interactions, motivations and insights that underlie discovery and 
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development.  In 2012, the FDA Safety and Innovation Act created a new regulatory 
designation for breakthrough therapies to facilitate the approval of therapies that 
address major unmet clinical needs.41  Studying innovations that qualify under this 
designation may serve as another strategy to understand how breakthrough 
therapeutics came about.  Ultimately, the complexity of medical innovation likely 
requires a multi-faceted method approach. 
 
1.3 Prior work 
In the business literature, Shane and Venkataraman published a seminal work 
presenting a conceptual framework of innovation and entrepreneurship; in that article, 
the authors propose that entrepreneurship opportunities must first exist, which then 
enables individuals to recognize these opportunities and exploit them.42   Later works 
provide additional support to this conceptual model by highlighting the central roles 
played by individuals in recognizing and then acting upon sources of opportunity.43,44   
Social science methodologies have frequently been applied to answer questions 
about medical innovation.  In a classic work,45 Coleman tracked the diffusion of a single 
class of antibiotics (tetracyclines) in four local markets and highlighted the central role 
played by early-adopters who then influenced the prescribing habits of colleagues.  
However, this study and a follow-up work on tetracyclines46 focus on the later-stage 
diffusion of the innovative drug and do not assess how this antibiotic was developed or 
the key individuals involved. 
In another study, Consoli and Mina outlined a conceptual model of medical 
innovation as an interplay between three major domains: (1) an individual sphere in 
which interactions between practitioner and physician reveal problems and 
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opportunities, (2) the technology and science systems in which research advances and 
clinical testing are done, and (3) the broader scientific domain in which non-application 
based work is performed.  Using coronary artery disease and glaucoma as empirical 
examples, the authors use a bibliometric-based method to demonstrate the 
interconnectedness between large industry players and smaller companies and that 
research hospitals acted as key nodes of innovation.47  In a study of 4 medical 
technologies (3 surgical devices and 1 biocompatible implant) through interviews with 
key individuals, the authors identified the dominant role played by physician-users in the 
invention of the technology as well as the establishment of necessary collaborations.  
The profile of these physician-users included a high motivation to develop new 
solutions, highly specialized knowledge that provided them insight into the opportunity 
and clinical need, and supportive development environment.  The authors conclude that 
the starting point of innovation results from an incremental accumulation of knowledge 
defined by the clinical problem at hand.  They postulate that industry did not originate 
these technologies given the lack of a deep understanding of user needs and an 
inability to creatively incorporate relevant technologies outside of the domain in 
question.27 
Within the field of ophthalmology, a case study on the development of intraocular 
lenses focused on understanding the development process.  This work also showed the 
key influence of clinicians on early innovation, selection of promising designs, and 
further dissemination of the technology to other ophthalmologists.48  Although the 
intraocular lens study and other sociological models are useful to frame the larger 
context of innovation, these studies were not done with the explicit goals of providing 
insights or recommendations for present-day innovation.  They also remain specific in 
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regards to specialty areas, limiting the authors’ ability to make more generalizable 
conclusions. 
In the clinical literature, publications have highlighted recent breakthrough 
innovations.49,50 Although these studies serve as useful resources to identify what 
qualifies as a breakthrough medical innovation, they do not provide insights on how 
these innovations developed.  There are examples of specialty-specific publications that 
track the development of important innovations in greater detail.  For instance, in the 
oncology space, articles and other forms of media have been produced chronicling the 
development of imatinib (Gleevec),51,52 trastuzumab (Herceptin)53 and bevacizumab 
(Avastin).54  Other analogous articles chronicling major advances in otolaryngology 
(cochlear implants),55 psychiatry (chlorpromazine)56 and robotic surgery innovations57 
have also been published.  The general goal of these studies is to reveal important 
historical facts and credit key individuals, not to identify lessons for future innovation. 
 
1.4 Purpose of inquiry 
The key goal for this inquiry is to study transformative medical innovation that 
emerged in the golden era of the 1980s and 1990s to derive lessons for medical 
innovation today.  In particular, I hope to identify and highlight key features of the 
innovative process that promoted or hindered the development and eventual approval of 
these technologies.  Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the innovation process 
and a lack of prior works employing both rigorous qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, I focused on the following specific aims: 
• Analyze transcripts of semi-structured interviews with successful biomedical 
innovators across multiple transformative medical devices and pharmaceutical 
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products for specific insights and opinions on the differences between the 
innovation process that led to these discoveries, and key features of the current 
innovation climate 
• Investigate the origins and factors around the early innovation process using one 
transformative technology as an in-depth case study by interviewing key innovators 
and gleaning lessons from these interviews relevant to present day innovation 
• Demonstrate a novel methodology of evaluating the patent literature as an 
additional method of identifying the origins around one transformative technology 
and apply lessons from these results to present day innovation   
• Synthesize the lessons learned from these transcripts of innovators and results 
from an in-depth case study to provide policy recommendations that would most 
likely spur on future transformative innovation 
 
2.0 Methods 
Several methodologies were employed to investigate this topic.  Techniques 
included a qualitative analysis through semi-structured interviews with innovators.  
Separate corroborating analyses were performed using the available clinical, patent and 
FDA literature.  The ethics review board at Brigham and Women’s Hospital approved 
the study. 
 
2.1 Identifying examples of transformative medical innovation 
The first methodological step involved determination of transformative 
innovations.  Although there is no single definition that describes a ‘transformative’ or 
‘breakthrough’ innovation, these technologies are generally characterized by meeting an 
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unmet need for the first time generating high user value, inducing a substantial change 
in current practice and displaying significant differences compared to existing 
technologies.49,50 In 2011, Kesselheim conducted a modified Delphi protocol survey to 
identify the most transformative drugs and devices approved by the FDA in 14 different 
medical fields.  The survey covered leaders of clinical departments in each of these 14 
fields from the top 30 academic institutions in the United States in terms of NIH funding.  
These participants were instructed to identify the 5 “most transformative” products out of 
a list of all new molecular entities approved in their fields between 1985 and 2009.  
“Most transformative” was defined as a drug that was both innovative and had a 
groundbreaking effect on patient care and health care delivery.  On the basis of the 
expert consensus panel process, the list was expanded to include two medical devices 
as well.50   
 
2.2 Qualitative analysis: identifying lessons for innovation today 
Kesselheim and his research team used the regulatory, patent, and medical 
literature to identify key innovators who contributed to the development of the most 
transformative products identified through the Delphi protocol. Using a qualitative 
research approach, Kesselheim led semi-structured interviews with 147 of these 
innovators representing 12 different drugs, devices and biotechnology innovations 
(median 16 innovators/innovation, range: 3-19).  See Table 1 for a complete list of the 
innovations studied.  35% of these innovators were industry-based, 63% were academic 
or government-based and 1% represented either key investors or patient advocates.  
Interviews involved leading participants chronologically through idea conception, 
product development, testing, and approval.  To identify differences in the innovation 
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climate from then and now, participants were specifically prompted to provide lessons 
from their experience for current-day biomedical innovation. 
Eighty-one of the 143 interviewees (55%) explicitly discussed current-day 
challenges to medical innovators and differences between new product development 
now and during their contributions to the transformative products.  Among this cohort of 
81 interviews, 31 (38%) were from industry, 48 (60%) from academia/government, and 
2 (2%) from other environments (see Figure 1).  It was this cohort of interviewees who 
formed the basis for the research conducted for this thesis.  Transcripts of these 
interviews were analyzed using standard coding techniques58 and the constant 
comparative method of qualitative data analysis.59  Xu and Kesselheim reviewed a 
subset of 3 randomly selected interviews, focusing on the sections of the interviews in 
which current challenges to medical innovation and differences between historical and 
modern medical product development.60  Xu and Kesselheim then independently 
developed a qualitative coding scheme.  The coding schemes were then compared, 
discussed and reconciled to produce a final coding structure which consisting of 2 broad 
themes (drivers of innovation and hindrances to innovation) with 22 specific codes.  Xu 
then analyzed these interviews according to this coding scheme using the NVIVO 
qualitative research software program. 
 
2.3 Qualitative analysis: in-depth case study of bare metal coronary stents 
The coronary stent was selected as a case study for more in-depth analysis into 
the origins of innovation. Bare metal stents for treatment of coronary artery disease,61,62 
represent transformative devices49 that spawned the modern era of interventional 
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cardiology63,64 and became a multibillion-dollar industry,65 despite ongoing controversy 
over who deserved credit for their development.66 
Through a review of the regulatory, patent, and medical literature, I targeted thirty 
seven potentially relevant stent innovators, including six high priority targets.  Fourteen 
agreed—including all of our high priority targets—while two declined.  Two additional 
participants were identified through referrals.  Both Xu and Kesselheim jointly conducted 
semi-structured interviews with these fourteen stent innovators.  See Table 2 for a full 
list of stent innovators who participated in interviews. 
Interviewees were asked to proceed chronologically through idea conception, 
product development, testing, and approval.  Next, participants were asked to assess 
how academic medical centers, various companies they interacted with, and 
government regulatory authorities were involved with the work at different stages in the 
development.  Third, participants were asked to recall how each phase of the 
development process was funded (private vs. industry vs. government), and whether 
patents were sought to protect their intellectual contributions.  Finally, participants were 
asked to consider the roles of individual initiative, environmental factors, serendipity vs. 
strategic planning, advances in science and technology, and clinical need.   
Median time for telephone interviews with stent innovators was 40 minutes 
(range: 23-75).  Interviews were transcribed and then analyzed using the same 
standard coding techniques as described above.59  As before, Xu and Kesselheim 
conducted independent analysis of three randomly selected interviews and developed 
separate coding schemes for organizing the data. The coding schemes were then 
compared, discussed and reconciled (using the NVIVO software package, QSR 
International, Melbourne, Australia) to produce a final coding structure which consisting 
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of seven broad themes (with 92 specific codes): (1) antecedents of stent development, 
(2) timeline of stent development, (3) key contributors to stent development, (4) the role 
of intellectual property, (5) the role of academic medical centers, (6) the role of device 
companies, and (7) other key characteristics of the inventive process. 
 
2.3.1 Patent search methodology 
To provide a complementary view into the sources of bare metal stent innovation, 
I conducted a comprehensive review of patents related to the initial development of the 
stent.  To determine the time period for the patent search, a Medline search identified 
reports of the major clinical events in the development of coronary artery stents. Search 
terms were (“history” OR “development”) AND (“stent” OR “coronary stent” OR “bare 
metal stent”).  From this search, review papers describing the history of the bare metal 
coronary stents as well as the earliest clinical validation studies were identified. The 
FDA on-line database for Pre-Market Authorization (PMA) approvals was used to 
identify the major regulatory approvals in this field.  Based on data from these sources, I 
concluded that the time period most relevant to the discovery of bare metal stents 
encompassed the years preceding the publication of the first pivotal studies on the 
effectiveness of the technology in 1994 and corresponding FDA approval.  
To identify patents related to bare metal stents that were approved during this 
time period, a search was deployed using the Thomson Innovation comprehensive 
patent database of US patent applications and granted patents.67 This tool, updated bi-
weekly, includes indexes content from the Derwent World Patents Index and the 
European Patent Office’s INPADOC database.  Overall, these records encompass 90 
countries with full text documents from seven authorities – the US, Canada, EPO, 
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Patent Cooperation Treaty, France, Germany, and United Kingdom, and English 
translations of abstracts from Japanese and Korean applications and granted patents.  
Patents in this database are searchable by terms of interest within the patent, including 
the title, assignee (the person or company that owns the inventor’s legal patent rights), 
abstract (short description), claims (list of items on which the applicant is seeking 
exclusive rights), description (a longer explanation of the elements of the invention and 
its function) and the classification code (internationally agreed upon hierarchical system 
of language independent symbols for the classification of patents).68 
The World Intellectual Property Organization’s natural language search engine 
(TACSY version 2.1.1) was used to locate the appropriate designation for classification 
of applications related to stents (A61F).  Within this patent classification section, 
A61F2/82 to A61F2/94 were identified as the group subclasses that would have 
included patents related to bare metal coronary artery stents (see Table 3).  Thomson 
Reuter’s innovation platform was then used to identify all patents filed under these 
subclasses until 1994.  A total of 532 relevant patents met these criteria.  A manual 
review of each patent was performed to identify the final sample.  I excluded patents 
covering vascular grafts, delivery systems for stents, catheters, stent removal or 
expansion devices and stents designed for use outside of the vasculature (e.g. 
urological applications).  Patents that covered combination catheter and stent systems 
were included along with novel methods to manufacturer stents.  The final sample 
consisted of 245 patents.  
 
2.3.2 Patent data extraction 
From each patent record, the date of application, the date of approval, the name 
 20 
of the inventor, the name of the assignee (if any), and the characteristics of the claims 
covered by the patent were extracted. An assignee is the person or company that owns 
the inventor’s legal patent rights.  To determine the rate of patent citations, our sample 
of patents by their application number were inputted to an electronic database of 
patents compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).69 The NBER 
database comprises of detailed information on approximately 3 million U.S. patents 
granted between 1963 and 1999, which includes the time period of our study.  The 
database displays the number of times each patent was cited by another patent 
(“citations received”).70 Citation count is a surrogate measure of the value of a patent, 
and has been linked to patent value and importance in previous economic analyses.33,71 
Next, using a methodology from Dr. Kesselheim’s prior research,72 each 
assignee was categorized to one of three groups: publicly traded, privately held, or not-
for-profit at the time of patent application.  Hoover’s database (Hoover’s Inc., Austin, 
TX) was used to determine the status of assignees.  This database includes records of 
65 million companies searchable by name, location or industry.  The profiles include 
overviews, history, financial records and initial public offering status information starting 
from 1948. Subsidiaries of public companies were categorized as public companies.   
Assignees without records in the Hoover’s database were researched with 
supplemental Google, Bloomberg, and Elsevier business intelligence searches.  For the 
20 entities without available data, an assignment as a small, private entity was made.  
Patents not assigned to a particular entity are legally the property of the named 
individual inventor(s).  Finally, patents that had been abandoned due to delinquent fees 
or penalized for late upkeep fees required by the USPTO were also identified.  Such 
delinquent patents are more likely to be of minimal value and not contribute 
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meaningfully to a marketable product.   
 
3.0 Results 
The most transformative products identified as a part of this thesis span a wide 
range of medical specialties from oncology to orthopedics.  These products include 
medical devices, small molecules, and biologic drugs. 
 
3.1 Opinions on innovations 
The participants in our study provided a wide variety of opinions regarding the 
factors contributing to their successful contributions to transformative innovation and the 
challenges facing modern medical product development (see Table 4).  The individuals 
and the institutions in which they worked were most often noted by our respondents as 
the primary drivers of innovation.  Our respondents also cited sound basic science 
foundation and collaboration as key elements that promoted successful innovation.  
Issues concerning intellectual property, in particular the challenges of technology 
transfer, and funding difficulties were identified as the most common hindrances to 
innovation.  Less often, regulatory policies and reimbursement were discussed.  Key 
quotes categorized by common themes are listed in Table 5. 
 
3.1.1 Drivers of drug and medical device innovation 
3.1.1.1 Individuals 
As one innovator of the vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) inhibitors that 
were transformative in the care of ophthalmology and to a lesser extent, cancer, 
summarized, “I think that individuals really still drive a lot of this.”  Specifically, most 
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innovators pointed to individuals with both the insight to recognize unmet clinical needs 
and the ability to push forward solutions.  For example, Robert Langer started working 
as a post-doctoral fellow on angiogenesis inhibitors and then went on to develop 
numerous biomedical innovations in his own career.  He attributed the eventual 
development VEGF inhibitors to Judah Folkman’s “original hypothesis that if you stop 
vascularization, that might be a new approach to cancer therapy” and Folkman’s 
persistence to the field despite skepticism from the existing clinical community.  Using 
bisphosphonates as another example, Rossini (head of research at Isitituto Gentili, a 
small company at the time) notes, “you often need a physician—scientist involved in 
these drug discovery programs ... somebody who really knows what’s an unmet medical 
need and what’s not.” 
Inevitably, breakthrough innovation faced skepticism and setbacks requiring 
champions to continue pushing development forward.  Michael Brown, a Nobel Prize 
winner for his role in describing cholesterol biology and a former member of Pfizer’s 
Board of Directors, stated, “every drug that has ever come to market has had an internal 
champion.”  He explains that “every drug gets knocked down somewhere along the way 
before it finally reaches market.  There is some scare that happens, some perceived 
toxicity in some animal model and turns out not to be relevant or they get the first lad 
compound and it has horrible pharmacokinetics and somebody has to believe in the 
project to continue to work and find the right compound.”  Internal champions were 
essential to push development forward in spite of clinical challenges and internal 
politics.  In the case of the statin class of drugs, transformative in their impact on 
lowering cholesterol and reducing incidence of cardiovascular disease, Al Alberts and 
Ed Scolnick of Merck stood behind the continued development of the first member of 
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the class, lovastatin (Mevacor), despite concerns of the mutagenicity of the compound 
in animal models and elevations of liver enzymes in early human trials. 
 
3.1.1.2 Supportive institutions 
The institutions in which innovators worked were similarly instrumental to the 
drug discovery process.  The three types of institutions discussed most often were 
academic centers, large pharmaceutical manufacturers, and small companies.  
Academia was noted to be an environment conducive to essential scientific 
investigation, most commonly before large or small companies saw a viable business 
opportunity.  Each of the transformative innovations included in this study had clear and 
direct ties to work done in academic or government laboratories.  Graham Russell, one 
of the key physician-scientists involved with the testing and recognition of the 
therapeutic potential of bisphosphonates in bone disease, noted that academic based 
investigators “kept this field [osteoporosis] going during the first 15-20 years before big 
pharma really got involved” by pursuing “some fairly wacky ideas” targeting “diseases 
which really hadn’t been treated” at the time.  
Work performed at academic centers for these transformative products frequently 
extended beyond basic science work and the elucidation of pathophysiologic 
mechanisms.  Predominantly supported by government funding, Jan Vilcek at New York 
University (NYU) had already developed early polyclonal antibodies to tumor necrosis 
factor (TNF) and lymphotoxin by the time the fledgling biotechnology company Centocor 
approached him with a licensing agreement for his work.  Neither he nor the company 
had a clear diagnostic or therapeutic product in mind, but Vilcek’s work ended up 
forming the basis for the first TNF blocker tested in clinical trials, infliximab (Remicade).  
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One innovator of the anti-CD-20 targeted cancer therapeutic rituximab (Rituxan) pointed 
out that “now academia has become more commercial on doing clinical trials” by 
establishing the necessary “infrastructure development” to test new innovations 
clinically.   
Academic institutions were criticized for lacking resources to translate impactful 
science to commercial products.  Langer explained that he began starting companies as 
a development vehicle for the research performed in his MIT laboratory in the late 
1980s because he “wanted to see that [drug development] process speed up” by getting 
“the resources to make those things happen” given the “tremendous amount of time and 
money” required for drug development.  In all cases, partnership with industry was 
necessary to engage larger scale clinical trials, and negotiate the FDA approval 
process.   
However, large companies were often cited as being risk averse and particularly 
resistant to development of these transformative technologies, because the innovations 
challenged prevailing opinions at the time about the origins of disease, blazed new 
therapeutic approaches, or represented unknown risks.  Ulrich Sigwart, a pioneer of 
coronary artery stent designs, noted that after Pfizer acquired the rights to his first stent 
design in the 1980s, litigation over mechanical failures of their Bjork-Shiley aortic valves 
compelled the company’s leadership to pull completely out of the implantable cardiac 
device field, including abandoning Sigwart’s first stent designs.  Several years later, 
Sigwart partnered with Advanced Cardiovascular Systems to develop his stent 
concepts.  Another stent pioneer, Julio Palmaz, endured frequent rejections from 
multiple different medical device companies before finally negotiating a development 
agreement with Johnson & Johnson after 5 years of validation studies.  He recalled, 
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“people hated the stent; they hated it.  It was incredible.  When you would go to a 
company and would show them the stent in the early ‘80’s ... immediately you can see 
their face, they start rolling their eyes, and kind of making scowls.”  Our respondents 
note that in the modern day climate, industry has grown to direct more of its attention 
and resources towards less risky products.  One statin innovator complained that in 
industry, “the major change has been a switch from looking for cures to looking for 
marginal advantage.” 
Predicted reimbursement—largely related to expected market size of the 
therapeutic—was often the leading factor in the industry’s interest—or lack thereof—in 
investing in new technologies.  Nearly all of the innovations we studied faced skeptical 
industry investors along the way because estimated market size was inappropriately 
perceived to be limited. When Ciba-Giegy and Sandoz merged to form the Novartis in 
1996, management reviewed existing programs.  By this time, the tyrosine kinase 
inhibitor imatinib (Gleevec) was a relatively mature compound ready for formulation and 
toxicity testing.  According to Brian Druker, the oncologist primarily responsible for 
proving the therapeutic potential of imatinib in chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), 
priority for imatinib’s program at Novartis suffered because it was “so low on the priority 
list” given that CML “by their market estimate” would never be able to “make back their 
investment.”  
In the cases where large pharmaceutical manufacturers demonstrated lack of 
interest, small start-up entities performed the initial commercialization work for 
innovations originated in the academic setting.  Small companies were noted to have 
the benefits of a singular focus on one product, capital efficiency and a less 
bureaucratic structure.  Isaac Kohlberg, a technology transfer expert who mediated the 
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NYU-Centocor relationship that ultimately led to the discovery of infliximab, commented 
that small companies represents “the development vehicles” best able “to take a project 
up to Phase I and Phase II” given that “in a large company because of the turnover of 
people, and the many other projects that they are developing and the not-invented-here 
syndrome things may fall between the cracks.”  Rituximab represents another example 
of the advantages of a small company, which was developed for a total budget 
estimated by one innovator to be $17 million dollars “which is unheard of, but that’s 
because we were a small company.”   
 
3.1.1.3 Collaboration 
Many respondents viewed that open relationships among innovators, particularly 
between scientists in academia and industry, contributed to innovation.  In the 
development of VEGF inhibitors, one innovator emphasized that “if you were 
collaborative with things, a lot can be accomplished and so we were able to accomplish 
a lot more in this field and area because various groups were collaborating so that we 
could have ever have done if that wasn’t the case.”  Collaboration allowed scientists 
with different expertise to focus on separate, equally critical components of innovation.  
Druker noted, “we’ve got to figure out ways for companies and academics to work 
together quickly, efficiently and effectively. That’s what we did” in developing imatinib.  
He went further by explaining that as an academic based researcher, “I’m not going to 
do the formulation. I’m not going to do the toxicology.  Drug companies do that really 
well.  I’m going to set up the model systems to test their drugs. I’m going to run the 
clinical trials. That’s what I do really well.”  
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Some respondents felt that collaboration in recent years among academia and 
industry had diminished due to shifts in focus of industry to ‘safer’ drug targets and 
change towards less mutual trust.  One statin innovator wished “some of these ‘me-too’ 
drugs were not occupying the attention of the drug companies when they could be 
looking for new drugs.”  Several respondents discussed a change in scientific culture 
where, as one HIV therapeutic innovator put it, “everyone’s a lot cagier than they used 
to be.”  When anesthesiologist John Sear, who conducted some of the early clinical 
trials on propofol, was asked how information exchange between academia and 
industry has changed, he answered, “the fact that there was a considerable degree of 
trust on both sides meant that information was freely available for discussion. I think 
today you know you can't get anything unless you sign three pieces of paper and almost 
swear that you’ll shoot yourself if you ask the wrong question.”  Increasing concern 
surrounding academic based conflict of interest policies was the most commonly cited 
sub-theme that deterred collaboration and free information exchange.  Thomas Fogarty, 
who contributed to the development of stents and several other catheter based medical 
devices, noted, “conflict of interest has been carried to a point where you can’t work with 
some of these companies.  Well the fact is, we as physicians cannot do anything 
without our companies. Companies can’t do anything without us ... Stanford and 
Harvard both view industry as the evil empire. Well, they can be if you let them ... 
they’re throwing the baby out with the bath water.”   
 
3.1.1.4 Strong underlying science 
More than a quarter of our respondents believed that transformative innovations 
had their foundation in a strong understanding of basic biologic processes and 
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pathophysiology.  Well-delineated basic science was key to increasing the likelihood 
that breakthrough therapeutic innovation would be successful clinically.  Alexander 
Wlodawer, who contributed to the development of HIV protease inhibitors by first 
studying a protease isolated from Rous sarcoma virus, stated “you cannot simply try to 
develop drugs in a practical way with insufficient basic understanding of the system.” 
Jan Mous, an industry based innovator involved with HIV protease inhibitor, added, “the 
best combination to be successful and to be productive and fast is to have a strong 
interest in the basics and the physiology of the disease or in this case, of the infection.  
Through a deep understanding of these mechanisms, and the target, that will increase 
the likelihood that a specific compound will end up becoming a successful drug.”  
Indeed, the ultimate development of HIV proteases drew on years of background 
research on the protein structures of retroviral proteases without the explicit goal to 
develop drugs. 
In the case of VEGF, Judah Folkman’s initial hypothesis and work on 
angiogenesis factors of tumors started as early as the 1960s.  The first VEGF inhibitors 
approved by the FDA more than thirty years later was built on robust underlying 
research and tens of thousands of publications in the peer-reviewed literature 
describing the biology of the various regulatory molecules of angiogenesis, in vivo 
cloning of capillary endothelial cells and polymer science.  In regards to stents, Richard 
Schatz, a cardiologist who contributed to increasing the flexibility of the original Palmaz 
stent, explains that much of their success was because “we spent a lot more time on the 
design and a lot more time proving that it worked. All the others were just kind of wham-
bam. ‘Let’s get it out there as fast as we can’ but without any data.” 
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3.1.2 Hindrances to innovation 
3.1.2.1 Intellectual property 
Interviewees who discussed intellectual property agreed that the culture in 
academia has shifted toward greater legal protection of scientific discoveries by seeking 
and obtaining more patents.  Jonathan Leis, who developed the first effective assay 
systems for a key HIV enzyme that helped catalyze discovery of antiretroviral therapy, 
explained, “I was trained to seek the knowledge [as a basic research scientist] and 
publish it and work out as much of it as you can.” Leis noted that patenting was not a 
part of the process neither he nor his university considered at the time.  However with 
the changing culture, Leis remarked that today “we set up screens for small molecules 
... if we find it then we would patent it and talk to the drug companies for developing.”   
The opinions were mixed in regards to whether this cultural shift promotes or hinders 
innovation.  Some reported that patenting by academic institutions is a fair way to 
ensure some of the windfall from new drugs was re-invested into research.  For 
example, one rituximab researcher reasoned, “I don’t think it would be a barrier to have 
interposed patents and licenses and some royalty flow to the university from this 
success ... it’s too bad the university didn’t benefit from this, and that Genentech and 
IDEC [now Biogen Idec] were the only beneficiaries.”  However, others were frustrated 
by the change.  Russell, involved with the discovery of bisphophonates, described that 
this shift does not necessarily protect meaningful innovations: “it’s gone too far. There’s 
a lot of rubbish that gets patented out of universities.”  Many innovators believed that 
the new focus on patenting hindered the core mission of academic institutions to 
conduct research and share freely.  Nobel laureate, Mike Brown, explained that early 
clones of HMG-CoA reductase were shared between academia and industry much 
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more easily because “back in the 1980’s, our university didn’t insist that we patent it and 
we didn’t patent anything.  So the legal things were obviously totally different from 
today.” Patents relating to research tools were identified as more likely to hinder to 
innovation, as compared those covering potential therapeutics and devices.  
Technology transfer offices were often cited for complicating the innovation 
process.   The administrative burden and inefficiency of the system precludes efficient 
translation of scientific discoveries to commercial products.  Phil Romano, an angel 
investor in Palmaz’s coronary artery stent, helped negotiate a technology release from 
the University of Texas San Antonio, remarked that such a release would be more 
difficult in the present climate and has generally avoided seeking out university-based 
technology in his post-stent medical entrepreneurial ventures because “we tried going to 
universities and universities come to us but they are so damn hard to deal with I mean 
it’s ridiculous ... we don’t bother with them.”  Both academic- and industry-based 
innovators agreed that the current process of transferring technologies patented by 
universities to commercial entities was more time intensive and difficult than it used to 
be.  Stuart Schlossman, a scientist who helped describe the CD20 antigen attacked by 
rituximab, explained that now “technology transfer probably protects the hospitals to 
better extent” with the drawback that process can be “intrusive in the relationship that 
you might be able to have with a pharmaceutical company because many of them have 
very good scientists.  And, many of them would be complementary to the work that you 
could do.”  Russell lamented, “you can’t work in a university these days without them 
wanting to patent you opening the door for them” and when patents are applied for by 
technology transfer offices “they don’t really have much to offer, they have a problem 
passing them on to licensees.”  In order to facilitate innovation, one physician-innovator 
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noted, “the first thing we do when we get a great idea now is get it outside [the 
academic setting] and get it commercialized.”   Richard Stack, a physician-scientist at 
Duke University, explained that in the early days of the stent he and his team were 
among the first to conceive and patent the concept biodegradable coronary stents73—
this has only recently become translated into a promising new class of stents.74  Stack 
explains that difficulty navigating the technology transfer process was a key reason why 
he and his team abandoned further investment in the biodegradable stent during the 
1980s.  
A minority of interviewees specifically pointed to the current need for material 
transfer agreements (MTAs) in sharing reagents and other products between academic 
and industry scientists, whereas open sharing was commonplace in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Tony Adamis, who helped develop ophthalmologic uses of VEGF inhibitors 
while at Boston Children’s Hospital, explained that discovery of the drug was greatly 
aided by his cooperative relationship with Genentech-based Napoleone Ferrara.  
Ferrara “made it move fast” with the mindset of “let’s figure out the truth here, what’s the 
science.” Adamis recalls that Ferrara would “send me packages on dry ice every few 
months, just was extremely generous. We couldn’t do those experiments without him.”  
Imatinib pioneer Druker supported a universal MTA to facilitate collaboration and 
interaction because “then it would take a week to get these agreements implemented 
instead of six months to a year with everybody negotiating over all the same things, 
publication rights, intellectual property, all these things.” 
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3.1.2.2 Funding challenges 
Several respondents commented that supporting the research critical to 
breakthrough innovation is growing increasingly difficult given stagnant government 
funding.  Patricia D’Amore, who worked as a vascular biologist on angiogenesis in the 
eye, explained that in the present climate it is difficult to pursue the basic research that 
could uncover new therapeutic options when “government funding is so uneven and 
unpredictable.”  Nora Heisterkamp, key in uncovering the science of the Philadelphia 
chromosome translocation ultimately targeted by imatinib, noted that it is now difficult for 
a researcher to “go off onto a tangent and discover things.  That wouldn’t be possible 
based on the very restrictive NIH granting system.”  Given the requirement to procure 
NIH funding to cover an investigator’s salary, she found that there is now less security 
to “develop new avenues of research” than when she was cloning the breakpoints of the 
Philadelphia chromosome. 
Criticism on funding challenges extended beyond government sources to private 
sources as well.  Venture capital was cited as becoming more risk averse in terms of 
investing in medical technologies.  One academia-based stent innovator pointed out 
that the “venture capitalists don’t want to invest in new ideas because they may never 
get paid for it.”  Another early stent innovator on the industry side remarked on the 
increasing burden of proof required by venture capitalists, “now the venture capitalists 
want human data before they’ll plunk any money in.”  Industry sponsorship was not 
cited as a significant form of funding for our academic-based researchers. 
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3.1.2.3 Regulation and innovation 
Opinions were mixed on the role of government regulation in innovation.  Some 
criticized the FDA as being a hindrance to innovation.  Romano (stents) specifically 
identifies the unpredictability of FDA examiners in evaluating approval applications—
“there is probably so much technology and so many good things that could come out 
and help people that because one examiner doesn’t think it’s going to do what it’s 
supposed to do or set up the testing properly and whatever, it gets railroaded, it gets 
smashed.”  Numerous innovators have noted that the FDA has required higher levels of 
efficacy and safety.  Holloway (HIV) noted that in the case of new antivirals “you have to 
demonstrate that you're better than whatever's out there, especially.  We're moving 
toward having AIDS medications that are going to be generic so you're going to have to 
have a much higher barrier to show that your compound is significantly better.”   Michael 
Brown mentioned that the first statins were approved based on “a 2,000 patient two 
year trial” while new cholesterol medications now would be required “to do a 30,000 
patient, 5 year trial. Instead of just measuring cholesterol in the blood, they have to 
actually count heart attacks.”  Thus, “the FDA has become much, much more 
conservative and demands much, much higher levels of safety and efficacy.”  Although 
the majority of respondents felt that the FDA has become more demanding in its 
requirements to prove safety and efficacy, there are others who wonder whether there is 
sufficient rigor required in the approval of high-risk medical devices. However, it is 
important to note that the device regulatory process differs significantly from the drug 
approval process in that there is greater variation in the regulatory requirements of 
devices based on its function and risk.   
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3.2 Origins of innovation: in-depth analysis of the coronary artery stent 
To further explore the medical innovation process, the next section of the thesis 
focuses on the coronary artery stent and the results emerging from qualitative 
interviews with key innovators as well as a quantitative review of the early patent 
literature.  See Table 6 for illustrative quotes regarding the development of the coronary 
artery stent. 
 
3.2.1 Precedents for coronary artery stent innovation 
Interviewees pointed to three antecedent developments that set the stage for the 
development of coronary artery stents.  The first was the practice of dilating arteries 
using percutaneous angioplasty, pioneered by Charles Dotter, a radiologist at the 
Oregon Health and Science University in the 1960s.  Dotter developed his early 
catheter prototypes with the aid of Cook Inc, a small company founded by an early 
medical entrepreneur, Bill Cook.  The second major antecedent was the development of 
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA).  Andreas Gruentzig, a 
German cardiologist who came to Emory University in 1980, helped pioneer angioplasty 
in the coronary arteries.  A final key development mentioned by participants was 
improvement in the manufacturing of catheters required to deliver stents to the coronary 
arteries. Several innovators cited John Simpson, a cardiologist at Stanford University, 
who introduced a new catheter system that vastly improved steerability.  He founded 
ACS, a privately held medical device company, to commercialize catheters and 
guidewires. 
 
3.2.2 Coronary artery stent development 
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The first coronary artery stents emerged from three teams.  Two were US-based, 
with one led by Julio Palmaz and Richard Schatz, and another by Cesare Gianturco and 
Gary Roubin.  The third was European-based led by Ulrich Sigwart.  Table 7 outlines 
key stent development milestones. 
 
3.2.2.1 Palmaz-Schatz stent 
Argentina-trained radiologist Julio Palmaz attended a talk by Gruentzig at the 
Society of Interventional Radiology Meeting in New Orleans in 1978.  On the taxicab 
ride back to the airport, Palmaz drafted his initial concept of the stent.  Palmaz soon 
began fashioning his slotted tube stent design in his garage.  Palmaz moved to the 
University of Texas-San Antonio in 1980 to continue his work.  With dedicated research 
time and laboratory space, Palmaz finished animal studies of his stent, which he 
presented at the Radiological Society of North America annual meetings in 1984 and 
1985.  In 1985, Palmaz met Richard Schatz, an interventional cardiologist conducting 
research at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio.  Schatz made a 
modification to Palmaz’s design to improve the stent’s flexibility and introduced Palmaz 
to his friend Philip Romano, a restaurateur.  Romano provided $250,000 in seed money 
and the three formed Expandable Grafts Partnership (EGP) in late 1985 and then filed 
the first patent application on the technology. 
Prior to EGP, Palmaz unsuccessfully sought company partners.  However, with 
more mature technology and a business partner, EGP licensed its intellectual property 
to Johnson & Johnson in 1986 for $10 million and a royalty percentage (6-9% on use in 
the coronaries and 3-6% for peripheral use based on gross sales).  Johnson & Johnson 
provided engineering support for Palmaz and Schatz and organized and funded the 
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pivotal trials for US premarket approval.  Human experiments with the Palmaz-Schatz 
stent occurred in peripheral arteries in 1987 and coronary arteries in 1988.  First sales 
of the stent came in Europe by 1988.  The FDA initially rejected the first Palmaz-Schatz 
stent application in 1993.  However, the team quickly reapplied and gained FDA 
approval in August 1994 for the elective use of the Palmaz-Schatz stent for restenosis 
on the basis of two pivotal trials (BENESTENT and STRESS). 
 
3.2.2.2 Gianturco-Roubin stent 
Cesar Gianturco was an accomplished innovator in interventional radiology who 
did much of his work at the Carle Clinic in Urbana, Illinois before becoming a professor 
of experimental diagnostic surgery at the University of Texas MD Anderson Hospital.75 
Gianturco had a long history working with Cook Inc. having developed balloon-
deployable metallic stents and intravascular filters for peripheral vessels.76 With funding 
and engineering support from Cook, Gruentzig collaborated with Gary Roubin, then a 
cardiologist at Emory, to develop a coronary stent based on Gianturco’s initial wire coil 
designs.  After Gruentzig’s untimely death in a plane crash, Roubin continued the 
development, and after about a year started testing a balloon-expandable flexible coil 
stent (Gianturco-Roubin Flex-Stent).  This stent was tested to treat acute vessel 
closure, a medical emergency, following balloon angioplasty, and gained FDA approval 
in early 1993 for this indication.  
 
3.2.2.3 Wallstent and Multilink stent 
Ulrich Sigwart was a cardiologist working at the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire 
Vaudois in Lausanne, Switzerland.  In the early 1980s, Sigwart built self-expanding 
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stents from an elastic wire braid, inspired by cylindrical Chinese finger traps made from 
woven strips of bamboo.  The University’s experimental surgery department and a grant 
from the Swiss National Fund supported initial prototypes and animal studies.  In 1985, 
Sigwart partnered with MedInvent, a small private medical device company in 
Switzerland, to provide additional supplies and manufacturing and engineering support 
for the stent, which was later named the Wallstent.  This work led to the first stent 
placement in the coronary arteries of patients in Europe.64 In 1986, MedInvent was 
acquired by Schneider, a subsidiary of Pfizer, but the company put development of the 
Wallstent on hold due to liability concerns.  
With Wallstent development at a standstill, Sigwart began to work in 1989 with a 
small team at ACS, a private catheter focused company, to pursue a balloon-
expandable stent, leading to the MultiLink stent.  In 1993, the first Multilink stent was 
implanted in a patient in London.  In 1997, it was approved by the FDA and quickly 
gained market dominance due to its improved steerability. 
 
3.2.2.4 Other stents 
A second wave of coronary artery stent designs were commercialized more 
expeditiously due in part to regulatory approval pathways blazed by the earliest 
innovators.  For example, whereas the FDA required the Palmaz-Schatz stent to be 
tested in the peripheral circulation before being applied to coronary arteries, this hurdle 
was not imposed on any other designs.  Independent US-based inventor Dominic 
Wiktor developed a stent with Medtronic that was FDA-approved in June 1997.  
Advanced Vascular Engineering’s stent was approved in December 1997; Medtronic 
subsequently acquired the company in 1998.  European interventional radiologist Ernst 
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Strecker developed stents for peripheral use in the 1980s and partnered with Boston 
Scientific—which went public in 1992—to create a self-expanding coronary artery stent 
(approved late 1998).  More recently, stent innovation has prioritized drug-eluting stents 
and bio-absorbable stents, which can be traced to work by Richard Stack at Duke 
University in the early 1980s. 
 
3.2.3 Role of individuals 
We found wide agreement that individual inventors played the primary role in 
early development (Table 2).  When describing the origins of this transformative device, 
respondents commonly pointed to the key contributions of Drs. Palmaz, Schatz, 
Gianturco, Roubin, and Sigwart. 
These key innovators were early adopters of coronary artery angioplasty and had 
first-hand exposure to clinical problems related to the technique, most notably post-
angioplasty restenosis.  In interviews with all (Gianturco was deceased), they conceived 
of the stent as an alternative to angioplasty or as a way of preventing abrupt artery 
closure, a medical emergency.  As Sigwart noted, “I found that balloon angioplasty was 
unpredictable, and I said, we must find some sort of endo-luminal support.” 
The inventors also did substantial work in developing the technology. After failing 
to secure industry partners in the early 1980s, Palmaz progressed through animal 
studies himself and filed the Investigational Device Exemption to begin human testing.  
Similarly, Sigwart engaged in prototype development and animal testing of the Wallstent 
on his own time. 
All of these innovators faced substantial skepticism.  As Palmaz said, “People 
hated the stent; they hated it.  It was incredible.  When you would go to a company and 
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would show them the stent in the early ‘80’s ... immediately you can see their face, they 
start rolling their eyes, and kind of making scowls.  There was something about stents 
that everybody disliked.”  This skepticism was shared by others outside of industry.  The 
Veterans Administration’s rejections of Palmaz’s grant applications to fund his work 
compelled him to find private funding through Romano and Schatz. 
 
3.2.4 Role of industry 
Most interviewees described the entry of large medical device companies after 
stent prototypes had been sufficiently developed and tested in laboratory and animal 
trials.  Risk was cited as a primary factor that hindered earlier industry involvement.  
According to interviewees, companies believed it was physiologically incompatible to 
implant prosthetic material in the coronary circulation.  Companies also had legal 
concerns.  The Bjork-Shiley mechanical heart valve had been recalled around that time 
for safety reasons prompting Pfizer to halt development of Sigwart’s first stent product.  
Cook Inc. was concerned about legal risks related to the potential failure of implantable 
cardiac devices, necessitating Roubin to personally file the first Investigational Device 
Exemption application to begin testing his stent in humans.  Given the invasiveness of 
the technology, there was also significant concern regarding the FDA approval process 
and the “difficult regulatory environment.”  Finally, according to interviewees, many 
companies perceived substantial business risks.  According to Palmaz, consultants from 
McKinsey & Co. provided a strong recommendation to Johnson & Johnson against 
investing in the Palmaz-Schatz stent believing the market size to be too small.  
When they became involved, medical device companies provided financial 
resources and engineering to test design hypotheses of physician-innovators.  The 
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company’s engineers also supported manufacturability.  However, individual inventors 
reported that they accounted for ease of manufacturing in their initial prototype designs.  
The Palmaz-Schatz laboratory-produced prototype was essentially manufacture-ready 
when Johnson & Johnson became involved.   
Second, medical device companies provided necessary support in organizing 
clinical trials and negotiating the FDA approval process.  Organizing the randomized 
trials and FDA premarket authorizations took seven to eight years to complete.  The 
inventors estimated that the companies invested in the range of $100-$500 million in the 
processes leading to device approval, earning revenues surpassing that investment 
within a year or two after the devices were approved. Supporting a key result from our 
multi-innovator analysis, internal champions at Johnson & Johnson were cited by 
Schatz, Romano and Palmaz as crucial in pushing the stent project forward.  Lastly, 
device companies provided existing sales channels to deploy the technology, although 
innovators such as Schatz helped convince other clinicians to adopt the technology. 
 
 
 
3.2.5 Role of intellectual property 
We found that ownership of intellectual property played a minimal role in 
incentivizing early innovation in this field.  No key inventors initially sought out patents 
after developing their stents citing a combination of a lack of expertise, funding 
limitations and a philosophical commitment to research dissemination.  Our 
interviewees each said that the potential profitability of the resulting products was not an 
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important consideration.  They indicated that a pressing unmet clinical need was what 
drove their work. 
The key innovators in our study considered themselves uninformed about 
patents.  Sigwart said, “I was completely naive in the area and the only thing I wanted 
was to get the scaffold into the angioplasty.”  Palmaz first broached the subject of 
patenting with the University of Texas in 1984, six years after he first conceived of his 
stent, but reports that he was told by university officers that his work was not patentable.  
Without patent protection, Palmaz presented his work that year to the public at a 
national conference of radiologists later leading to a loss of European rights.  In 
Roubin’s case, he recalled no involvement with patenting at all, leaving that to his 
colleagues at Cook.  Sigwart did not initially apply for a patent on his work; rather, 
intellectual property protection was sought first by MedInvent only after he signed a 
contract releasing the technology rights to them.   
Patents ultimately became paramount in the context of the larger corporations 
that later became involved in stent commercialization.  Upon forming EGP, Romano 
required Palmaz and Schatz to explicitly extricate the University of Texas’s possible 
ownership of the technology.  The partnership then applied and paid for its own patent.  
Johnson & Johnson later expended substantial resources, in the words of one 
interviewee, “expanding the patent limits.”  The patent record became crucial as these 
larger companies engaged in litigation with one another.  By 2002, multiple lawsuits 
between Johnson & Johnson, Cordis, Medtronic and Boston Scientific about which 
company had priority to overlapping designs of their different versions of coronary artery 
stents resulted in billions of dollars in damages and fees.66 In one judgment, Medtronic 
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and Boston Scientific paid Johnson & Johnson $1.2 billion for patent infringement on the 
Palmaz-Schatz stent. 
A lax posture towards patents excluded some inventors and key contributors 
from financial rewards.  For example, the University of Texas San Antonio, which 
financially supported and provided laboratory space for important early proof-of-concept 
experiments conducted by Palmaz, declined to invest the resources to patent the 
discovery.  Ultimately, Palmaz offered them a 3% share of his royalties, which has since 
led to an estimated $10-$30 million in total payments to the university.  Roubin and 
Emory University similarly received no royalties from his work or the testing that 
occurred in university laboratories, although Cook later provided Roubin with a financial 
gift to recognize his contribution.  Without patents, Sigwart and his institution received 
no royalties from his original innovations, even after the technology was sold to Pfizer.  
This negative experience led him to change his approach towards intellectual property 
in his subsequent collaboration with ACS. 
 
3.2.6 Innovator characteristics 
Key inventors were all physicians directly exposed to the clinical problems they 
were seeking to address.  Most interviewees specifically remarked on these inventors’ 
aptitude and vision, such as their ability to recognize potential innovative solutions to 
emerging clinical problems such as coronary artery restenosis.  Interviewees also 
pointed to the inventors’ resiliency despite considerable resistance from the medical 
community.  Another common quality was that inventors were seen as risk-takers, in 
contrast to the widespread perceptions that the companies were risk-averse. 
Interestingly, a background in engineering was not necessary.  All individual inventors 
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were able to directly develop prototypes from raw materials and deploy them in animal 
models. 
 
3.2.7 Collaboration 
Collaborative work was central to the early development process.  For the 
Palmaz-Schatz and Gianturco-Roubin stents, each inventor brought different 
contributions to building the device.  Interviewees cited the importance of collaborations 
between the academic inventors and their colleagues in medical device companies for 
engineering support.  Other unofficial collaborations also helped move the development 
process forward.  For example, Palmaz received early assistance from an engineer not 
affiliated with his academic medical center in learning about manufacturing processes 
such as laser etching that he could use to produce a prototype of his stent concept.  
Interviewees also recalled the inventors discussing their work at national professional 
meetings, and the importance of these open brainstorming sessions in facilitating 
progress of the individual projects. 
 
3.3 Patent literature analysis of the coronary artery stent 
Accounts of coronary artery stent development date back to the late 1970s, 
although the first clinical report did not appear until 1985 (Table 2). Until 1994, there 
were a number of key preclinical, clinical, and regulatory steps leading to the approval 
of bare metal stents for use in coronary arteries, which quickly became widely used 
after that point.  In an analysis of 12 US hospitals (detailed in the next section), stent 
use as a percentage of percutaneous transluminal coronary angiography procedures 
increased from 5.4% in 1994 to 69% by 1997.77  
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3.3.1 Overall patent data 
We identified 245 patents relating to coronary artery stents during the years 
1984-1994 that involved 107 unique assignees.  Private companies were assigned the 
most patents (110, 44.9%), followed by public companies (77, 31.4%), individual 
inventors (44, 18.0%) and non-profit entities (14, 5.7%).  See Table 8.  Twenty entities 
that were not identified within our database searches were designated as private.  
Public companies had the greatest ratio of patents filed to assignees (4.3) among all the 
different assignee subtypes, suggesting that public companies were the most likely to 
seek multiple patents in this area.  Average citation count was similar across individual 
inventors, non-profits, private companies or public companies. 
Individual inventors (19, 43%) and non-profit entities (5, 36%) were more likely to 
be associated with patents that were delinquent in fees or expired due to a lack of 
payment.  This is consistent with the fact that individual inventors and non-profit entities 
have less funding for the purposes of filing and maintaining a patent.  Removing these 
patents from the database did not substantially change the average patent citation 
count for any of the assignee subtypes. 
 
 
3.3.2 Most influential patents 
To identify the key sources of intellectual property contributed to coronary artery 
stent development, we then focused on the most highly cited patents, and found that the 
share of patents belonging to privately held companies increased compared with the 
overall sample.  Among the top 25% most highly cited patents, privately-held companies 
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contributed a larger proportion (51%, 31 patents), publicly traded companies contributed 
16 patents (26%), individuals contributed 12 (20%), and non-profit entities contributed 2 
(3%). 
The top ten cited patents in our sample are even further skewed towards 
privately held companies (Table 9).  Expandable Grafts Partnership, started by the 
physician co-inventors of the Palmaz-Schatz stent, owned the most highly cited patent 
(1,857 subsequent cites), as well as 4 out of the top ten.  Cook Incorporated, which 
commercialized the Gianturco-Roubin stent, owned the third most highly cited patent 
(1,017 subsequent cites) and fifth most highly cited (966 subsequent cites).  The 
Gianturco-Roubin stent and Palmaz-Schatz stent were the first two stents approved in 
the US market, in 1993 and 1994, respectively (Table 7).  By contrast, Medtronic, a 
public company, owned the second most highly cited stent (1,039 subsequent cites), 
although its Wiktor stent was relatively late to the US market and was not approved by 
the FDA until June 1997. 
 
3.3.3 Temporal trends in patenting 
Starting in 1984, the total number of stent-related patents filed per year steadily 
increased (Figure 2).  The largest percentage increases in patent counts were in 1992 
(68%) and 1994 (97%).  Privately held companies dominated patenting early in the 
study period, contributing to the majority of patents in every year from 1984 through 
1989.  Publicly traded companies did not control a majority of patents until the final two 
years (1993 and 1994), although the increase in public company patenting rose 
substantially over the last 5 years of the sample.  Rates of patents owned by individuals 
and non-profit entities stayed generally constant throughout the time period studied. 
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4.0 Discussion 
Although our interview subjects developed groundbreaking advances in disparate 
fields, similar themes emerged from their insights on transformative innovation today 
compared to their past experiences.  The core components of transformative medical 
innovation continue to center on the roles of individuals and the institutions they 
represented.  Reflections from our respondents suggest that a host of factors either 
hinder or catalyze transformative innovation.  Meaningful collaboration and strong 
underlying science were cited as consistent catalyzers.  Major obstacles to 
transformative innovation currently included an increasing lack of early stage funding, 
and intellectual property and other challenges that prevent collaboration.  Our results 
also showed that changes to the regulatory and reimbursement environment were not 
as influential to transformative medical innovation.  From our in-depth study of stents, 
the results generally support the findings from the multi-innovation analysis with some 
caveats, in particular with regards to the role of FDA regulation.   
 
4.1 Individuals and innovation 
Our results are consistent with tenets of entrepreneurial theory, which 
emphasizes the central role individuals play in identifying and acting upon 
opportunities.42,44 As seen in the innovations sampled in this paper, these individuals 
acted as either visionaries who recognized meaningful unmet clinical needs, scientists 
and engineers who were experts on the underlying pathophysiology and science or 
internal champions who remained persistent despite naysayers and setbacks.  Often 
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times, these individuals crossed institutional boundaries, made personal and 
professional sacrifices in order to push forward their respective innovations.   
Another secondary finding is the interconnectedness of innovators to one another 
in regards to mentorship and counseling, a phenomena that has been reported in the 
field tissue engineering.78  In the case of statins, both Brown and Goldstein had an 
existing relationship with Scolnick at Merck, in that they all were residents at 
Massachusetts General Hospital together. Goldstein worked previously in Scolnick’s 
laboratory at the NIH before moving on to the University of Texas Southwestern. Nadler, 
an innovator involved in the development of Rituxan, was a mentor to Druker (imatinib) 
at Dana-Farber Cancer Center.  Prior work has shown that academic scientists were 
more likely to engage in commercial activities when their colleagues were highly-
regarded scientists who engaged in commercial activities prior.79  From our results, 
strategies focusing on supporting and connecting these highly skilled individuals would 
likely support transformative innovation. 
Our in-depth study of the stent found that much of the early work was also 
pioneered by individual inventors, not only in generating ideas in the face of substantial 
skepticism, but also in prototype development and early testing.  These individual 
inventors were motivated by the desire to address a pressing clinical problem.  
Moreover, the clinical imperative arose from complications of the emergence of balloon 
angioplasty, as well as from the desire to apply existing experimentation with peripheral 
artery stents to relieve coronary artery blockages.  The fact that many of the key 
innovators were physicians who could draw on their direct experience with patients 
turned out to be central to recognizing and addressing this clinical need.  Important 
parallels have been shown in the case of electron microscopes—Riggs and von Hippel 
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also found that the majority of innovations with the highest scientific importance were 
developed by the users of the instruments.80  Physician-innovators provided the driving 
force behind overcoming concerns about legal risk and limited market potential that 
arose from risk-averse established companies.  The inventors’ scientific know-how 
allowed them to move their projects forward, with some innovators reporting even 
building their own prototype stents in their garages.  Their experiences in dealing with 
patients with coronary artery disease provided them with motivation to push their ideas 
forward.  
The stent patent results also support the findings that individuals played a critical 
role in the early innovation process.  Prior work shows that individual physicians 
account for almost 20% of all medical device patents during 1990-1996 with compelling 
evidence that patents filed by physicians have higher impact as measured by citation 
number compared to patents originating from industry only.81  Our analysis of stents is 
consistent with this as individual inventors accounted for 18% of all patents granted for 
stents between 1984 to 1994, behind only private and public companies.  Within both of 
these private companies, individual physicians operating in academic medical centers 
drove the underlying product design and development.  
4.2 Institutions and innovation 
All of the individuals included in this study operated within institutions with 
separate strengths and weaknesses.  In the case of drug development, there has been 
a long-standing belief that the pharmaceutical industry’s research leads to most new 
medicines,82 while public institutions like NIH support medical innovation separate from 
drug development.83  This sentiment is also expressed in the device market, as industry 
representatives have pointed to themselves as the primary sources of new products.76 
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Others point to the primacy of small companies in the device innovation process.84  Our 
results challenged some of these traditional beliefs.  
From our cohort, academia was generally credited with offering the freedom to 
pursue new avenues of research while large industry boasted significant resources, 
manufacturing expertise and regulatory experience.  In some instances, small 
companies served as effective commercialization engines.  Small companies 
represented an attractive acquisition for larger, better-funded entities to further develop 
promising technologies.  For instance in the case of coronary stents, Medtronic 
purchased Arterial Vascular Engineering in 1998.85 Johnson & Johnson licensed stent 
technology from Expandable Grafts Partnership in 1988, while Schneider Inc., then a 
subsidiary of Pfizer and now a part of Boston Scientific, purchased MedInvent, a small 
private Swiss company, in 1986 to gain access to an early stent design pioneered by 
Ulrich Sigwart, then an interventional radiologist working at the Centre Hospitalier 
Universitaire Vaudois in Switzerland.  More importantly, our results show that there is no 
clear demarcation between institutional roles in developing transformative innovation.  
Work in academia would extend beyond simply idea generation or basic science 
research into prototype development and regulatory work.  In a minority of cases, small 
companies and industry also conducted and supported critical underlying science that 
only later became breakthrough products.   Indeed, new models for drug development 
are showing a more integrated model where industry is increasing its upstream work 
and academia is conducting more commercialization activities.86,87  
In the case of stent development, the institutional roles played by academia, 
small and large companies generally supported the findings from the broader multi-
innovation analysis.  Individual innovators supported by academic medical centers were 
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the primary source of transformative device development.  Schatz, Sigwart, Gianturco 
and Roubin all operated within academic institutions during the preliminary phases of 
their work.  Moreover, these researchers often times extended into areas of 
development that included manufacturing considerations and validation studies for 
regulatory approval. Under the chairmanship of Stewart Reuter in the UTSA Department 
of Radiology, Palmaz was able to develop his stent prototypes to the point of being 
nearly manufacture-ready.  Roubin at Emory submitted his own investigational device 
exemption (IDE) to the FDA in order to clinically evaluate his stent design.  An industry 
executive commenting specifically on our stent work, argues that large companies play 
in the success of a medical breakthrough by lending expertise in product development 
and iterative refinement, even though the early ideation came from physician-
innovators.88  Even though industry plays a significant role in funding medical device 
development, the high-risk and early stages of development requires continued support 
from public funding.89 
The patent data supported the findings derived from the interviews.  The earliest 
and most impactful patents were attributed to individual physician-inventors who formed 
or worked with smaller private companies.  Only after more clinical validation and 
development occurred did larger public companies become more involved in the 
patenting space.  Often times, larger public companies would use their considerable 
resources to acquire intellectual property developed by smaller private companies or 
physician-inventors including the instance where Johnson & Johnson licensed 
technology from Expandable Grafts Partnership or Medtronic and Arterial Vascular 
Engineering. Non-profit entities (e.g. hospitals and universities) only represented a 
minority of patent holders for stent technology, despite the fact that academic based 
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physician-inventors were identified as the primary driver of stent innovation.  There are 
at least two possible explanations derived from our results.  The first is that in the 1980s 
and 1990s, universities and hospitals were less interested in investing resources and 
time to file patents.  A further discussion on the implications of the growing interest of 
patenting by non-profit for innovations is detailed in later sections.  A second 
explanation for a lack of patenting from non-profit institutions is that physician-inventors 
who develop a commercially valuable product may simply chose to work with private 
companies or form their own rather than working with their academic employers—this is 
less likely given the existence of invention disclosure policies among employers, 
academic or industry-based.  
 
4.3 Promotion of innovation: underlying science and collaboration  
A key finding of this study is that areas of innovation where the best underlying 
science was done were more likely to lead to game changing diagnostics and 
therapeutics.  Investigators noted that insights and hypotheses responsible for eventual 
therapies depended on insights gained from prior, basic science work.  Strong 
underlying science also provided a better understanding of the mechanism of action and 
risks of a potential therapeutic, thus lowering the risk of failure in later, larger scale 
studies.  A recent quantitative study investigating how new molecular entities were 
discovered between 1999-2008 suggests that target-based approaches without an 
optimal determination of the underlying molecular mechanism were less likely to lead to 
new therapies.40  Others have postulated that areas of high scientific activity and 
publications precede the development of novel drugs that draw on these new 
discoveries.39  As the NIH turns more towards translational science, there is 
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considerable uncertainty surrounding support of basic research.  From our results, basic 
research is critical to the wellspring of future transformative therapeutics.  
In the case of stents, Palmaz and Schatz explicitly highlight the importance of 
rigorous underlying science.  Palmaz first conceived the stent as early as 1978, sixteen 
years before the first FDA approval.  Both Palmaz and Schatz believe that the extensive 
animal and pre-clinical testing they invested at UTSA before eventual commercial 
launch was critical to their eventual early market dominance over less-proven and less-
rigorously tested competitors.  A rigorous bibliometric review of patent citations for early 
patent stents was beyond the scope of this thesis.  From our interview results, these 
early patents did explicitly borrow from earlier research done in related fields such as 
peripheral and urological stenting.   
Beyond strong science that elucidated new pathways and targets, the success of 
transformative innovation depended on the ability for individuals from different 
institutions to collaborate. Given that no single entity can claim end-to-end responsibility 
for the transformative innovations in our cohort, collaboration remained essential for 
knowledge exchange, research tools and resource pooling.  On an individual level, 
academic based researchers with less than two-thirds of their total research support 
from industry were as productive academically while also engaging in more 
commercialization activities compared to faculty without any industry collaboration.90,91 
Universities and departments with established collaborations with industry have been 
shown previously to be better able to realize commercial opportunities.92,93  Currently, 
industry is becoming increasingly active in establishing closer relationships with 
academic institutions to explicitly develop new breakthrough therapies.87  Although 
collaboration itself was a positive driver towards innovation, further work still needs to 
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determine the optimal degree in order to preserve intellectual freedom and the distinct 
expertise of separate institutions.   
As a medical device technology, the importance of collaboration is underscored 
in the case of stents.  Although physician-innovators operating in academic institutions 
represented the early drivers of technology ideation and development, larger companies 
played an important role in manufacturing and organization of large-scale clinical trials.  
Palmaz, Schatz and Romano enjoyed the regulatory expertise and additional funding for 
necessary clinical studies from Johnson and Johnson.  Sigwart and Khosravi, a project 
manager at ACS, enjoyed a fruitful relationship where ACS engineers refined and 
developed Sigwart’s vision.  Physician-innovators with existing relationships with 
companies were able to more speedily advance their work (Gianturco/Roubin and Cook 
Inc.) as compared to those who did not (Palmaz).  This is supported by other empirical 
work which shows that relationships between academic researchers and industry 
facilitates the uptake of transformative ideas and nascent technologies.94,95  To attract 
industry interest, Palmaz had to demonstrate more clinical efficacy in animal studies 
and human case studies than did the innovators allied with Cook Inc., who already had 
a longstanding relationship.  This ultimately led to a delay in the availability of coronary 
artery stents by several years.  
 
4.4 Hindrances to innovation: intellectual property and funding challenges  
Transformative medical innovation is rare for many reasons both societal and 
scientific.  The culture surrounding intellectual property has shifted to emphasize 
patenting discoveries in academia.  Between the years 1995 and 2000, twenty of the 
top fifty patent entities were assigned to institutions whose primary mission was non-
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commercial.96  A historical concern from academia is that an interest in patenting and 
commercial activity leads to undermining of information sharing.97  Others have argued 
that a focus on patenting and commercialization creates conflicts that take away from 
the true social purpose of biomedical research to publish scholarship.98  Although more 
recent evidence suggests that publishing scholarly articles and commercialization 
activity are not necessarily mutually exclusive,99 our respondents were conflicted about 
the implications of patenting in academia.  On one hand, patenting enables academia to 
recoup its investment on new discoveries and fund more research.  On the other hand, 
patenting in academia may limit individuals and institutions from interacting with one 
another as freely as before and publishing data freely.  
Specifically within the general area of intellectual property, innovators in both 
academia and industry strongly agreed that technology transfer in academic institutions 
acts as a major bottleneck to innovation today.  Since the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 was 
enacted, the technology transfer process at academic institutions has been criticized for 
a lack of sufficient processing capacity, poor return on investment, and inability to 
efficiency commercialize technology.100,101 Our results concur with prior reports calling 
for simplification of the academic-industry licensing process in order to facilitate 
commercialization of breakthrough technologies.102  The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill (UNC) offers an interesting test case.  UNC recently introduced a standard 
agreement (the Carolina Express License) available to any member of the university 
interested in commercializing inventions with a particular focus on the life sciences.101  
In the subsequent years following its implementation, UNC went from forming an 
average of 3 new companies per year to 7.6 with 79% of these entities choosing to 
accept the standard agreement.103  In agreement with prior single innovation studies,104 
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none of our respondents from industry or academia suggested increasing patent terms 
as a method to promote transformative innovation.  
The coronary artery stent has a complex litigious history including direct issues 
with the technology transfer process.  Tracing this history to the early origins of the 
stent, presentations made at medical conferences by Palmaz about the design of their 
stent jeopardized EGP’s ability to claim intellectual property rights outside the US.  
Finally, we found that concerns and focus on patenting played a very limited role 
in the early stages of the coronary artery stent.  Notably, in recent years, physician-
innovators and academic medical centers have shown greater propensity towards 
obtaining patents.105  Some reports have suggested that the proliferation of patents 
might hinder transformative innovation,106 pointing to specific examples where this has 
been the case in the medical device market.107 For example, innovators of the stent 
agreed with innovators from our multi-innovation cohort—they pointed to current-day 
patenting trends as harmful to the essential collaborative relationships they developed 
during their work on coronary artery stents, and blamed these trends on certain 
university technology transfer offices seeking greater control over patent rights or 
insisting on burdensome licensing agreements.107 However, inattention to patents in the 
stent case also led to inequitable distribution of royalties, with some important early 
innovators and institutions being excluded from deserved royalties.  Although Sigwart 
developed early designs of the stent, his lack of experience in the role of patents and 
commercialization allowed MedInvent to own all intellectual property rights—MedInvent 
was eventually acquired by Pfizer for an estimated $80 million USD ($159 million 
adjusted for inflation), while Sigwart did not enjoy any financial reward.  Further 
research is required to determine whether increased attention to patents and revenue 
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generation on the part of physician-innovators and academic research centers in 
modern times does indeed contribute to reduced innovation, and if so, whether 
alternative mechanisms for identifying key contributors to transformative innovation and 
their proper compensation are necessary. 
The patent literature is able to lend some corroboration to an inequitable 
distribution of windfall.  The early literature does shows that MedInvent was an assignee 
of some of the earliest patents in the stent space.  Cook Inc. was noted to be the 
assignee from the intellectual work done by Roubin and Gianturco.  Roubin noted that 
at the time, he did not have a formal royalty agreement with Cook Inc. Unfortunately, the 
patent literature is unable to show the existence of agreements between inventors and 
outside institutions with the assignee listed.  
Beyond intellectual property issues, financing new, transformative research with 
limited preliminary data remains a challenge.  As venture capital, public and industry 
sponsored investment in biomedical research continues to decline, there is considerable 
uncertainty on future streams of early-stage funding.  Often times, such research goes 
against prevailing opinions of the time.  Comments from our respondents suggest that 
the present-day funding climate limits the ability for researchers, particularly non-
established individuals, to follow new areas of high-risk, high-reward work.  Our results 
show that although industry was noted to have significant resources for drug and device 
development, very few members of our cohort describe significant industry funding of 
the underlying science and early validation work behind transformative innovations.  
This finding is supported by empirical work describing a continued decline in industry’s 
investment in academic based research over the past 20 years.91  Expansion of more 
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risk-tolerant funding strategies from both public and private sources is necessary to fill 
this gap. 
In the development of the stent, funding challenges represented a major barrier. 
Palmaz found significant difficulty winning grant funding for his work.  Both Palmaz and 
Sigwart depended on discretionary department funds from their respective academic 
institutions to fund their early work—these innovators used their own funds to pay for 
necessary research tools.  In some respects, the lack of funding pushed both innovators 
to reach out to small companies (MedInvent) or form new entities (EGP).  In the case of 
Sigwart, this led to a highly unfavorable agreement.  Given the perception of the 
innovators we spoke with that established companies and venture capitalists were—and 
remain—generally risk-averse regarding highest risk and most innovative medical 
technology, funding for such work outside of these channels is critical.  This suggests 
that supporting research in new devices through entities such as the NIH and facilitating 
the efforts of innovators like Palmaz who seek to move their discoveries out of the 
academic setting are likely to have the greatest impact in generating breakthrough 
discoveries.   
 
4.5 Regulation, reimbursement and other factors 
Our results suggest that regulatory and reimbursement considerations were less 
likely to be factors in the development of transformative technologies.  The majority of 
individuals who did discuss regulation agreed that the regulatory requirements for 
demonstrating safety and efficacy have increased today.  One possible explanation for 
this higher burden of proof is that the transformative innovations in this cohort 
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represented a new paradigm that future drugs had to meet where before there were no 
therapeutic options.6  
In the case of stents, interviewees were more critical of the FDA as a hurdle to 
innovation compared to interviewees involved in pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
innovations.  The reasoning behind this most likely lies with the inherent differences in 
device and drug regulation.  A more detailed description of the regulatory process of 
medical devices is outside of the scope of this thesis.108  Briefly, approval for medical 
devices most often occur through the 510(k) approval pathway—this pathway requires 
considerably less testing and clinical validation before approval.  It is offered to devices 
that are deemed low risk or can cite an existing technology previously approved by the 
FDA to match equivalency.  Life sustaining devices such as stents or artificial heart 
valves generally qualify as Class III devices and undergo a regulatory approval process 
similar to pharmaceuticals.  Specifically for devices, the FDA approval process has 
been criticized as overly burdensome in that it requires demonstration of safety and 
effectiveness, as compared to performance only regulatory systems like the EU.109 A 
systematic review completed in part by this author compared the regulatory system of 
the United States and European Union. The results showed no evidence that reducing 
the burden of regulation improves clinical outcomes.23  In fact, the FDA’s increased 
burden of proof has safeguarded American patients from the diffusion of now recalled 
unsafe or ineffective devices, which were originally approved in Europe and used on 
European patients.  High profile examples include the PIP breast implant, Watchman 
left atrial appendage ablator, the Watchman left atrial ablation device and PleuralSealTM 
lung sealant.110  The regulatory environment does impact innovation and there remains 
a tradeoff between the FDA’s responsibility to public health and the potential benefit of 
 59 
early access to new medical technologies—our results from the stent suggest that this 
is a downstream consideration that may affect devices more so than pharmaceuticals or 
biotechnology innovations.   
Concerns with eventual market size and reimbursement were a deterrent to 
innovation, particularly from industry actors.   Our results suggest that early estimates of 
market size in the case of both imatinib and the coronary stent were significantly under-
inflated.  McKinsey and Company, a global consultancy, advised Johnson and Johnson 
to pass on the Palmaz and Schatz’s stent product given the limited future market size.  
Coronary stents now represent a multi-billion dollar market.  Imatinib was considered by 
Novartis executives to be a niche market product.  In 2012, imatinib represented an 
estimated $4.2 billion in sales, which translates to approximately 13% of Novartis’s total 
yearly pharmaceutical revenues.111  In the end, predicted market size for nascent 
innovations was unreliable in predicting the final commercial value. 
5.0 Limitations of Work 
 There are both qualitative and quantitative limitations that exist with this 
investigation. 
5.1 Qualitative Limitations 
As a predominantly qualitative study, the sample size remains small and may 
introduce biases.  Our cohort of 81 innovators derived from the total analysis group of 
143 respondents exhibited similar percentage breakdown of academics and industry 
representatives.  For each of the innovations described in this study, opinions from both 
industry and academic innovators were analyzed.  Academics represented a higher 
proportion, which may skew the results in favor of the roles played by non-profit 
institutions.  However, the selection of these innovators was based on a clinical 
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literature review as well as referrals from other innovators in order to minimize this 
potential bias.   
5.2 Quantitative Limitations 
In regards to our patent analysis, it is possible that the entirety of patents in the 
field were not captured.  To reduce the likelihood that patents were missed, manual and 
automated inspections were performed.  However, patents classified under different 
codes would not have been included in our cohort.  Finally, our analysis of the early 
development of coronary artery stents used patent documents, so if other essential 
contributions were made and not patented in the US or if the patent application were 
rejected by USPTO examiners, we could have missed them.  We remain confident in 
our results, in part because the USPTO ultimately grants patents from 85% of all 
applications112 and because the two private companies that emerged as key to the field 
through our patent search were also the companies behind the first coronary artery 
stents approved by the FDA.  Still, the role of intellectual contributions not captured by 
patents in the development of coronary artery stents and other transformative medical 
devices bears further study. 
Although the stent represents a clear example of a transformative innovation, it 
represents a single case, which may not be generalizable.  However, our results are 
consistent with case histories of other transformative medical devices113 such as 
coronary balloon catheters114 and bone densitometry scanners.115  More importantly, 
the insights gleaned from an in-depth study showed strong agreement with the 
exception of the role of FDA regulation from our multi-innovation cohort.    
 
6.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications  
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Policymakers face a myriad of proposed strategies to spur medical innovation.  
Strategies include both upstream and downstream strategies to promote transformative 
innovation such as new funding mechanisms for research,116 creation of more public-
private partnerships,5 repealing excise taxes for medical device companies,117 
extending patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry118 and modification of the 
regulatory system.21  Our results derived from the opinions of prior successful 
innovators suggest that strategies that act on the local and institutional level are most 
likely to spur next generation breakthroughs.   
Early idea generation most often happens at the physician-innovator level.  This 
is exemplified in the case of stents.  Policies aimed to promote innovation should focus 
on enabling expert individuals to act upon the opportunities they identify.  These 
individuals should be provided the institutional support to collaborate with other 
individuals from separate institutions to develop their work. This development depends 
on a source of high-risk, high-reward funding.  Given the perception of the innovators in 
our cohort felt that established companies and venture capitalists were—and remain—
generally risk-averse regarding highest risk and most innovative medical technology, 
funding for such work outside of these channels is critical.  Both government and 
industry must continue to support the critical basic science underlying future 
breakthroughs.  Unfortunately, government funding for science has slowed in recent 
years, and faces substantial budget cuts in the future as well.119   
Collaboration between institutions with separate expertise and resources 
supersede challenges related to intellectual property concerns.   Policies on the 
institutional level should directly promote collaboration.  This enables academia to 
potentially enjoy the resources and regulatory expertise of industry, while offering 
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industry the opportunity to engage with thought leaders and invest in breakthrough 
science.  
Our cohort of stent innovators specifically pointed to current-day patenting trends 
as harmful to the essential collaborative relationships they developed during their work 
on coronary artery stents.  Some reports have suggested that the proliferation of 
patents might be hindering transformative innovation,106 and provided specific examples 
where this has been the case in the medical device market.107  As physician-innovators 
and academic medical centers have shown greater propensity towards obtaining 
patents,99 academic technology transfer offices must find improved methods to convert 
those patents into licenses for commercial development.  The significant proportion of 
our innovators pointed to the academic technology transfer process as a major 
bottleneck to transformative innovation.  Even delays measured in months can equate 
to significant revenue lost for a commercial entity given the finite terms imposed on 
patents.  Standardized agreements organized by category (e.g. biotechnology product, 
small molecule or significant risk medical device) and with preset royalty payments, 
licensing fees and milestones for biotechnology innovations would potentially eliminate 
costly and lengthy one-off negotiations for promising, but still nascent technologies.   
Although, federal policymaking on regulation and reimbursement do influence 
innovation, our work suggests that these changes would be less impactful.  There is no 
evidence from our results that taxation reductions for the medical device and 
pharmaceutical industry and patent extension will have a direct effect on transformative 
innovation.  These policies would more likely benefit only established devices and 
businesses. 
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7.0 Suggestions for Future Work 
There are numerous directions for future work.  The first step is to extend the in-depth 
analysis of stents to the other transformative innovations in this cohort.  Specifically, a 
study on the origins of all of the innovations in our cohort would allow the determination 
of descriptive statistics on the relative contributions of industry, academia, government 
and individuals.  In addition, in-depth patent analyses of more cases of transformative 
medical innovation enable similar comparisons.  This would also allow validation of this 
methodology as a robust and repeatable method of understanding and studying the 
innovation process.  Using the patent literature, a detailed study of co-inventors could 
be undertaken to uncover interconnections between individuals and institutions. 
In this study, we grouped transformative drugs and medical devices together.  
There are inherent differences to these two classes in regards to development, product 
lifecycle and regulation—these issues extend beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, a comparison between results between drugs and devices may identify 
specific recommendations for the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.  
Although our cohort represents clinically relevant medical advances, there have 
been more recent innovations in the past 10-15 years that represent breakthroughs in 
their own right.  Given the rapidly evolving environment of innovation, an updated 
analysis of a more recent cohort may provide valuable insights as well.  Examples of 
more recent transformative innovation can be identified through the FDA’s new special 
designation categories, which recognize new entities targeting major unmet clinical 
needs.41   
Another potential direction is a failure analysis.  This study focused on 
transformative successes.  However, many innovators also described instances of failed 
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innovations.  Nonetheless, the opinions and thoughts of innovators who did not 
ultimately succeed in developing medical technologies may provide additional insight. 
 
8.0  Summary of Work 
Medical innovation is critical to healthcare systems by providing solutions to 
unmet clinical needs.  Given the recent concern from multiple healthcare stakeholders 
that the pipeline of medical innovation is slowing, this thesis attempts to provide insights 
on how to spur breakthrough medical innovation in present day.  First, recent examples 
of transformative medical innovations were identified.  Second, key innovators 
responsible for these innovations were selected, contacted and interviewed using a 
semi-structured script.  Third, an exemplary case (coronary artery stent) was selected 
for an in-depth analysis, which included a detailed recounting of the development of the 
stent and an exhaustive analysis of the patent literature surrounding the stent.  Fourth, a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis was undertaken to specifically glean insights for 
present day innovation.  This thesis derives its findings and recommendations from one 
of the largest and most comprehensive collections of interview transcripts from 
biomedical innovators responsible for developing the most important devices, drugs and 
diagnostics used in medicine today to identify themes and improve generalizability.  The 
major findings include the following policy suggestions: 
• Support the physician-innovator, more often operating in an academic center and 
with direct exposure to the clinical need, to pursue high risk, high reward 
research 
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• Develop a supportive institutional environment that fosters collaboration with 
other individuals in outside institutions in order to share resources, expertise and 
research material 
• Continue funding basic science as the best preliminary work improves the 
chances that transformative innovation occurs 
• Reform the academic intellectual property transfer process to enable 
breakthrough science to become breakthrough commercial entities 
• Increasing reimbursement or patent terms and reducing regulatory burden are 
downstream considerations with policies aimed at these factors less likely to spur 
transformative medical innovation 
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10.0 List of Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1: List of transformative drugs and devices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology Application 
Medical devices 
Bare metal coronary stents Post-angioplasty restenosis 
Bone mineral density scanner Diagnosis of osteoporosis 
Small-molecules 
Anti-retroviral drugs Human immunodeficiency virus 
Bisphosphonates Osteoporosis, other diseases of bone loss 
Paclitaxel (Taxol) Ovarian and breast cancer 
Propofol (Diprivan) Anesthesia 
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors 
(“statins”) Hyperlipidemia 
Imatinib (Gleevec) Chronic myelogenous leukemia 
Biologic drugs 
Rituximab (Rituxan) Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma 
TNF-alpha inhibitors Autoimmune disorders 
Trastuzumab (Herceptin) HER2-positive breast cancer 
VEGF inhibitors 
Various solid tumors, retinal 
neovascularization and macular 
degeneration 
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Figure 1: Institutional roles of individuals in the total cohort and the cohort commenting 
specifically on lessons for innovation 
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Table 2: List of stent interviewees†  
 
Name Source Background Summary of role 
Brian Bates Referral Business development at Cook Medical 
Collaborator with 
Gianturco in stent 
engineering 
Andrew Cragg, 
M.D. 
Patent 
search 
Medical trainee at the 
University of Minnesota 
Developed early nitinol 
stent prototype 
Thomas J. 
Fogarty, M.D. 
Patent 
search 
Cardiac surgeon at the 
University of Oregon 
Developer of a catheter 
system and collaborator 
of Dotter 
Richard A. 
Hillstead 
Patent 
search Engineer at Cordis 
Early stent developer at 
Cordis 
Farhad 
Khosravi 
Patent 
search 
Engineer at Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems 
Developed Multi-Link 
stent with Sigwart at ACS 
Julio C. 
Palmaz, M.D.* 
Patent 
search 
and 
medical 
literature 
Interventional 
radiologist at University 
of Texas-San Antonio 
Lead inventor and 
developer of the Palmaz-
Schatz stent 
Leonard 
Pinchuk 
Patent 
search Entrepreneur 
Licensed stent-related 
intellectual property to 
Cordis 
Stewart 
Reuter, M.D. 
Medical 
literature 
Chief of Radiology at 
University of Texas-San 
Antonio 
Mentor of Palmaz; 
provided research 
funding, lab space during 
early stent research 
Phillip 
Romano Referral Restauranteur 
Financial investor, partner 
with Palmaz, Schatz 
Gary Roubin, 
M.D.* 
FDA 
records 
and 
medical 
literature 
Cardiologist at Emory 
University 
Developed and validated 
the Gianturco-Roubin 
stent 
Richard 
Schatz, M.D.* 
Patent 
search 
and 
medical 
literature 
Cardiologist in San 
Antonio 
Co-inventor of the 
Palmaz-Schatz stent 
Ulrich Sigwart, 
M.D.* 
Medical 
literature 
Cardiologist at the 
University of Lausanne 
(Switzerland) 
Developed the Wallstent 
and the Multi-Link stent 
Edward L. 
Sinofsky, 
Ph.D. 
Patent 
search Engineer at Bard 
Early stent developer at 
Bard 
Richard Stack, 
M.D.* 
Patent 
search 
Cardiologist at Duke 
University 
Early stent developer at 
Duke 
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and 
medical 
literature 
Ernst-Peter 
Strecker, 
M.D.* 
Patent 
search 
Interventional 
radiologist at the 
Freiburg University 
Clinics (Germany) 
Developed the Strecker 
stent and later contributor 
on stent development 
with Boston Scientific 
Sidney 
Wallace, M.D. 
Medical 
literature 
Interventional 
radiologist at MD 
Anderson Cancer 
Center 
Collaborator with 
Gianturco in stent design 
and application 
† In alphabetical order.  The identification of an interview source on this list does not 
imply endorsement of the article or its findings. 
* Pre-determined “high priority” interview target 
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Table 3: Search strategy used to identify coronary artery stent patents 
 
International 
classification 
Category description 
A61F2/82 Devices providing patency to, or preventing collapsing of, 
tubular structures of the body 
A61F2/84 Instruments specially adapted for their placement or removal 
A61F2/86 Stents formed from wire-like elements 
A61F2/88 Formed as helical or spiral coils (nets formed from intersecting 
coils) 
A61F2/90 The wire-like elements forming a net structure 
A61F2/92 Stents in the form a rolled-up sheet expanding after insertion 
into the vessel 
A61F2/94 Stents retaining their form after locating in the predetermined 
place 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
Table 4: Percentage of Respondents Discussing Specific Categories 
 
Major Categories n (%) Sub-Categories n (%) 
Role of Institutions 
36 (44) 
Industry 24 (29) 
 
Academia/government 22 (27) 
 
Small Companies 14 (17) 
Role of Individuals 
30 (37) 
Clinical Scientists 16 (20) 
 
Internal Champions 11 (14) 
 
Basic Scientists 4 (5) 
 
Translational Scientists 2 (2) 
Intellectual Property 
25 (31) 
Focus on Patenting 16 (20) 
 
Academic Technology Transfer 14 (17) 
 
Material Transfer Agreements 3 (4) 
 
Litigation Concerns 2(2) 
Collaboration 
21 (26) 
Conflict of Interest 9 (11) 
 
Academia/Industry 
Relationships 8 (10) 
 
Change in Openness 5 (6) 
 
Cultural Differences 2 (2) 
 
Greed 1 (1) 
Strong Underlying 
Science 21 (26) 
Funding Limitations 12 (15) 
FDA 7 (9) 
Reimbursement 6 (7) 
Luck  3 (4) 
Technology 
Improvements 2 (2) 
  
 79 
Table 5: Representative Quotations in Key Subject Areas 
 
Categories Selected Quotes 
Role of Individuals “I think that individuals really still drive a lot of this.” 
 
“Every drug that has ever come to market has had 
an internal champion.” 
 
“You have to have the courage to say yes to a 
certain idea, a certain therapeutic target and say 
‘we’ll go for it’ instead of trying to tackle 10 or 15 in 
the hope that one of those will be successful in the 
end.” 
Role of Institutions “I think that the major change has been a switch 
from looking for cures to looking for marginal 
advantage.” 
 
“So I wish some of these “me-too” drugs were not 
occupying the attention of the drug companies 
when they could be looking for new drugs.” 
 
“Often pharma companies are overwhelmed with 
the opportunities they might work on.” 
 
“More academic centers are working on things that 
have translational and practical impact. It’s quite 
hard. It’s quite expensive.” 
Intellectual Property “When you are talking about research tools like 
patenting and enzyme, which can be used as a 
target by companies, the patenting of research tools 
has hindered progress. 
I don’t think it would be a barrier to have interposed 
patents and licenses and some royalty flow to the 
university from this success.” 
 
“We tried going to universities and universities 
come to us but they are so damn hard to deal with I 
mean it’s ridiculous.  It’s terrible.  We don’t bother 
with them.” 
 
“You can’t work in a university these days without 
them wanting to patent you opening the door for 
them.” 
 
“There’s a lot of rubbish that gets patented out of 
universities. They all have their tech transfer office.” 
Collaboration “Biggest hurdle right now is how do you get ‘em out 
of the lab and into clinical trials and that’s the 
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hardest point.” 
 
“They’re just getting up to it but they’re doing it the 
wrong way, they’re throwing the baby out with the 
bath water.” 
 
“It has to do with the fact that even with the cultural 
differences between industry and academia we 
have to work together. I think it’s actually wonderful 
to work together.” 
 
We’ve got to figure out ways for companies and 
academics to work together quickly, efficiently and 
effectively. That’s what we did. what has happened 
in the intervening decade or 15-odd years is that it’s 
become much more difficult to form these 
relationships”. 
 
“Everyone’s a lot cagier than they used to be.” 
Strong Underlying 
Science 
“Follow the science, number one.” 
 
“I think just that good science prevails.” 
 
“The main lesson is that drug development is not 
possible without basic research.” 
 
“The thing that comes highest up on the food chain 
is the thing where the best preliminary work has 
been done.” 
Funding Challenges “It’s very hard to support research just on 
government funds these days because the 
government funding is so uneven and 
unpredictable.” 
 
“Investment what you can see is that the pharma 
industry hasn’t even just been flat since the 50s.  
It’s actually been declining in terms of efficiency and 
productivity in terms of what goes on the market.” 
 
“Venture capitalists don’t want to invest in new 
ideas because they may never get paid for it.” 
FDA “The FDA has become much, much more 
conservative and demands much, much higher 
levels of safety and efficacy.” 
 
“The FDA is a big issue and big problem.  There is 
probably so much technology and so many good 
things that could come out and help people that 
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because one examiner doesn’t think it’s going to do 
what it’s supposed to do or set up the testing 
properly and whatever, it gets railroaded, it gets 
smashed.” 
 
“If you think our budget is messed up take a close 
look at our FDA and how they approve products.  I 
mean we don’t really prove things the way we 
should.  There are too many little ways to get 
around.” 
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Table 6.  Stent Representative Quotations in Key Subject Areas 
 
Thematic area Illustrative remark 
Motivation “My involvement was driven purely and simply by a 
clinical imperative at the time.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“It was clear … that we had a huge shortcoming with 
[Gruentzig’s] method and that was his acute closure that 
led to tremendous amount of myocardial infarction 
emergency surgery.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“I felt very strongly being an operator. I wasn’t just an 
inventor. I was an operator.” [Physician-innovator] 
Obstacles to 
progress 
“We had to be very hard headed to accept all that 
rejection because it was systematic and relentless.” 
[Physician-innovator] 
Contributors to early 
success 
“We spent a lot more time on the design and a lot more 
time proving that it worked. All the others were just kind 
of wham-bam. ‘Let’s get it out there as fast as we can’ 
but without any data.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“We are more aggressive with filing patents today than 
we were back then, but in those days, we didn’t file any 
patents.  We just kept our nose to the grindstone and 
kept things moving.” [Company-based innovator] 
Risk and investment “When the thing is disruptive and totally outlandish, the 
companies stay away from it.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“So my first reaction when I was told what it was and 
what I should be thinking about designing was well that’s 
a stupid idea.  We’ve got diseased arteries that are full of 
stuff already, why would we want to put in a piece of a 
metal that’s going to be lifetime liability for us?” 
[Company-based innovator] 
Collaboration “So many, many months and changes and design went 
by working with the engineers from [company]” 
[Physician-innovator] 
 
“From an engineering product development perspective, 
they are extraordinary.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“When [company] took over we just basically showed the 
engineers what we wanted and that was it.” [Physician-
innovator] 
 
“I mean he had a lot of clinical issues that he saw that 
needed to be solved and he needed some help in doing 
that, and we helped him in any way we could.  It was just 
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a nice partnership.”  [Company-based innovator] 
Role of intellectual 
property 
“The impetus was to publish and it seems quaint now 
and maybe stupid, but we didn’t give much thought to 
patenting.” [Physician-innovator] 
 
“The patents of course are critical because no company 
wants to invest unless they have some IP.” [Company-
based innovator] 
“In those days, we were for a couple of years the number 
one patenting company in the nation, if not the world.” 
[Company-based innovator] 
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Table 7. Timeline of major pre-clinical, clinical, and regulatory events in the early 
development of coronary artery stents. 
 
Date Event Event type 
1976 Earliest description of balloon angioplasty for use in 
the coronary arteries by Gruentzig120 
Pre-clinical 
1978 Gruentzig presents his angioplasty technique at the 
1978 Society of Interventional Radiology Meeting in 
New Orleans, and concern about restenosis.  
Palmaz is in attendance121, 122 
Clinical 
1985 Gruentzig initiates a collaboration with Gianturco to 
develop a stent to reduce restenosis123 
Pre-clinical 
1985 Palmaz and Schatz describe the use of balloon-
mounted slotted-tube stent in the peripheral 
arteries124 
Clinical 
Mar 1987 First experimental coronary stent implantation in 
human patients by Sigwart using WallStent design63 
Pre-clinical 
May 1987 Strecker describes a new flexible intravascular stent 
at the Cardiovascular and Interventional 
Radiological Society of Europe and the Society of 
Cardiovascular and Interventional Radiology125 
Pre-clinical 
Feb 1991 FDA approval of Palmaz-Schatz balloon-
expandable stent (Expandable Grafts Partnership, 
Johnson & Johnson) for the biliary system 
Regulatory 
1992 Studies report efficacy and utility of Gianturco-
Roubin (Cook Inc.) stent to prevent emergency 
bypass surgery after angioplasty62 
Clinical 
May 1993 FDA approval of Gianturco-Roubin stent for 
coronary procedures, specifically emergency 
management of coronary closures during 
angiography 
Regulatory 
1994 BENESTENT study demonstrating efficacy of 
Palmaz-Schatz stent in patients with new coronary 
lesions in the main coronary arteries (n=520) 
published126 
Clinical 
1994 STRESS study demonstrating efficacy of Palmaz-
Schatz stent (n=410) published127 
Clinical 
Aug 1994 FDA approval of Palmaz-Schatz stent for elective 
coronary artery stenting49 
Regulatory 
1997 Stent use found in 69% of angioplasty 
procedures49Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Clinical 
1998 Restenosis Stent Study Group reported a major 
benefit of stenting for patients who experienced 
restenosis of a coronary vessel after balloon 
angioplasty 
Clinical 
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Table 8. Counts of coronary artery stent patents by assignee type (1984-1994) 
 
 Unique Assignees 
Patents 
Filed (n, %) 
Patents per 
Assignee 
Average 
Citation Count 
Average citation count 
standard deviation 
Non-profit 
entities 10 14 (5.7) 1.4 235 100 
Private 
companies 43 110 (44.9) 2.6 279 273 
Public 
companies 18 77 (31.4) 4.3 241 197 
Individual 
inventors 36 44 (18.0) 1.2 256 150 
Total 107 245 2.3   
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Table 9. Top ten cited patents related to coronary artery stents (1984-1994) 
 
Patent Assignee Assignee type 
Filing 
Date Title 
Citation 
Count 
US4733665
A 
Expandable 
Grafts 
Partnership 
Private 
company 11/7/1985 
Expandable 
intraluminal vascular 
graft has tube formed 
of thin rectangular 
section bars which 
expand to fit lumen 1,857 
US4886062
A 
Medtronic 
Inc. 
Public 
company 10/19/1987 
Intra-vascular radially 
extendable stent 
comprises zigzag 
wire wound into helix 
and made of low 
memory metal 1,039 
US4800882
A 
Cook 
Incorporate
d 
Private 
company 3/13/1987 
Endo-vascular stent 
for delivery system 
comprises wire 
formed into 
serpentine shape 
with alternating loops 
and bent into cylinder 1,017 
US4776337
A 
Expandable 
Grafts 
Partnership 
Private 
company 6/26/1986 
Expandable 
intraluminal vascular 
graft using 
angioplasty balloon 
associated with 
catheter to dilate and 
expand lumen of 
blood vessel 986 
US4580568
A 
Cook 
Incorporate
d 
Private 
company 11/13/1984 
Percutaneous endo-
vascular stent has 
zigzag stainless steel 
wire which is 
compressed for 
insertion 966 
US4739762
A 
Expandable 
Grafts 
Partnership 
Private 
company 12/12/1985 
Expandable 
intraluminal graft has 
thin walled tube with 
slots parallel to 
longitudinal axis 919 
US5064435
A 
Schneider 
Inc. 
Public 
company 6/28/1990 
Self-expanding 
prosthesis having 
stable axial length 
has slidable 
connected stent 848 
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segments of open 
weave constructions 
which are elastically 
deformable to reduce 
radius dia. 
US4994071
A 
Cordis 
Corporation 
Private 
company 5/22/1989 
Bifurcating stent 
device has balloon-
deflatable for 
withdrawal from 
vessel and used to 
expand stent 838 
US4856516
A 
Cordis 
Corporation 
Private 
company 1/9/1989 
Endo-vascular stent 
structure has 
cylindrical form 
expandable by 
applying radially 
outward force 736 
US5102417
A 
Expandable 
Grafts 
Partnership 
Private 
company 3/28/1988 
Implanting 
expandable vascular 
graft involves number 
of expandable and 
deformable grafts 
expanded within 
blood vessel 688 
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Figure 2. Yearly counts of coronary artery stent patents, by assignee type (1984-
1994) 
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